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From the Guest Editor
In March 2018, 95 undergraduate students from a variety of post-secondary institutions across North America 
gathered at Bridgewater State University to meet and share with one another their research and writing on current 
and historical subjects involving Canada, Quebec, and the United States. The one-day symposium was co-hosted 
by BSU’s Canadian Studies Program and Undergraduate Research Office, and generously supported by the Govern-
ment of Canada’s Consulate for New England and the province of Quebec’s government office in Boston. Named 
“Canada, the United States and Quebec in the Age of Trump,” the event featured the insights of students from BSU 
and other schools: Emerson College and SUNY-Buffalo in the United States; Carleton, McGill, Queen’s, Thompson 
Rivers, and Western universities, along with the University of Saskatchewan and the University of Ottawa in Cana-
da. Presenting singly and in teams, they analyzed the future of NAFTA, refugee policy and immigration reform, the 
president and the prime minister, Indigenous rights and Reconciliation, and health-care provision in Canada and 
the United States. One highlight of the symposium was a keynote address delivered by Dr. Michael Hawes, CEO of 
Fulbright Canada and a leading proponent of student research and scholar exchange between Canada and the U.S.
The high quality of presentations made on that day (and the enthusiasm that the event generated) inspired the pub-
lication of a special issue of The Undergraduate Review, BSU’s established undergraduate research journal. The essays 
featured in these pages showcase the hard work and the heights of insightful analysis that undergraduate research 
can entail. They demonstrate, clearly, how polished research and writing has become a central part of undergraduate 
learning for many students, in many institutions across North America. All of us in the Canadian Studies Program at 
BSU, now in its forty-sixth year of existence, were thrilled to be co-host of this event and we look forward to repris-
ing it in coming years.
Dr. Andrew C. Holman
Director, Canadian Studies Program
From the Editor of The Undergraduate Review
Bridgewater State University (BSU) has built a signature program of Undergraduate Research with significant fund-
ing and opportunities for students in any major to discover new knowledge and make original contributions to their 
discipline or community. Undergraduate Research has been an institutional priority at BSU for more than 20 years 
because students who are mentored by professors on projects in which they are deeply invested, gain highly valued 
experience and skills in critical thinking, problem-solving, collaboration, and communication. The experience of 
conducting authentic research under faculty mentorship makes undergraduates more successful students and out-
standing candidates for post-graduation competitive opportunities, thereby changing the trajectories of their lives.
Undergraduate Research includes the scholarly work from any academic field, and can take several different forms, 
from collaborating with professors on their scholarship to taking on long-term course assignments that go beyond 
traditional research papers and projects, such as by including a presentation of the results at a campus or disciplinary 
symposium. Dissemination of one’s findings is a key criterion of high-impact Undergraduate Research. When 
students share their work with an audience of peers, experts, and others in the academic and broader community, 
they become much more invested in the work than if they were “writing to the professor” to earn a passing course 
grade. They think more intentionally about the audience, purpose, and overall quality of the research and writing. 
They also develop deeper understanding of their areas of study as they reflect on and respond to audience members’ 
questions.
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For all of those reasons, BSU is proud to have hosted the “Canada, the United States and Quebec in the Age of 
Trump” undergraduate-research conference and to publish some of the highest quality research presented there in 
this special issue of The Undergraduate Review.
Dr. Jenny Shanahan
Assistant Provost
Center for Transformative Learning
6 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018 BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY
Indigenous Self-government? 
An Assessment of the Nisga’a 
Treaty Agreement
JACOB WEBSTER
Over the course of Canadian history, Indigenous peoples have endured a difficult relationship with the state. This relationship is indicative of the 
history of colonialism in Canada and continues be 
problematic in contemporary interactions between 
Canadian First Nations and the federal and provincial 
governments. The question of how Indigenous peoples 
fit into the Canadian federal system is a complex one 
whose answer depends largely on the specific contextual 
situation of each First Nations group. In this essay, I 
argue that the Nisga’a Treaty1 agreement exemplifies a 
commendable attempt at Indigenous self-government, 
which is consistent with the principles evoked in the 
Charlottetown Accord2 and in the scholarship on 
Indigenous self-government. In this way, the Nisga’a 
treaty sets up a model for Indigenous self-government 
that does not require constitutional change and is thus 
possible in the current constitutional context. The 
Nisga’a Treaty has withstood two judicial challenges 
and was informed by current constitutional principles 
(Aldridge and Fenge, 2015, 149). Because of its 
affirmed constitutionality, the Nisga’a Treaty provides 
a way forward within the current federal framework 
and provides a replicable example for First Nations. In 
order to argue that the Nisga’a Treaty creates a model 
for Indigenous self-government that is consistent with 
the theoretical ideals of Indigenous self-government, I 
first outline the principles evoked by the Charlottetown 
Accord and by scholars in the field of Indigenous self-
government. I then summarize the text of the Nisga’a 
agreement, identifying relevant sections that coincide 
or potentially conflict with the theoretical principles 
proposed in the first section. In order to conduct a more 
fulsome examination of the Nisga’a agreement, I also 
examine recent studies that endeavor to evaluate the 
success of the Nisga’a agreement based on its practical 
implementation in the community, not simply on the 
text of the agreement. By examining the text and the 
practical implementation of the agreement, I argue that 
the Nisga’a treaty agreement provides the framework for 
Indigenous self-government in a way that is consistent 
with the theoretical principles identified by the 
Charlottetown Accord and certain scholars. The Nisga’a 
treaty is a sound implementation of Indigenous self-
government that is possible without any constitutional 
change.
Theoretical Principles
In identifying the opinions of scholars on the principles 
of Indigenous self-government, it is necessary to 
identify the vein in the literature that proposes that 
negotiations between settler government and native 
peoples are inherently colonial. This method of thinking 
1 Signed on 27 May 1998, the Nisga’a Treaty was negotiated and 
signed by the Nisga’a nation, the Province of British Columbia and 
the Government of Canada, ostensibly to settle outstanding land 
claims. It went into effect on 11 May 2000.
2 The Charlottetown Accord was a package of proposed 
amendments to the Canadian Constitution that were considered 
by the provinces of Canada and the Canadian federal government 
in 1992, but was ultimately rejected. Among the reforms was a 
proposal to enshrine an Aboriginal right to self-government in the 
Constitution.
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provides little room for negotiation or compromise, but 
identifying this viewpoint is important. Paul Rynard’s 
work is emblematic of this critique of settler-Indigenous 
relations. Rynard generally disapproves of the Nisga’a 
agreement arguing that it does not represent a break 
from the past in the sense that it follows the same 
colonial channels of settler-Indigenous relations (2000). 
Furthermore, Rynard argues that the land negotiations 
between the Nisga’a and the state perpetuate a legal 
relationship of dependence of First Nations on the state 
that is inherently colonial (Rynard, 2000 p.240). While 
this critique is important and should be identified, 
it is not emblematic of other larger themes within 
the literature and precludes any state-First Nations 
agreement to help install self-government within the 
current constitutional structure. Rynard’s principles are 
valuable but are largely unrealistic given the unlikelihood 
of broad constitutional change.
 While Rynard’s critique and principles are 
unrealistic given the current constitutional regime, 
the Charlottetown Accord and the work of other 
scholars present their own frameworks that are more 
practically suitable for an assessment of the Nisga’a treaty 
agreement. 
 While the Charlottetown Accord failed in a 
national referendum in 1992, it nonetheless identified 
guiding principles for what its authors proposed as a 
“third order” of government. The Accord states that 
the Indigenous peoples of Canada, due to their status 
as the first peoples of Canada, have a right to govern 
their land and to promote their languages, cultures 
and traditions (Charlottetown Accord, 1985, S.2(b)). 
It further identifies their right to govern their own 
economies, identities and institutions (Charlottetown 
Accord, 1985, p.A s.4). It also states that the provincial 
and federal governments have a duty to negotiate 
with Indigenous peoples on issues of jurisdiction and 
on the use of resources and assets on Native lands 
(Charlottetown Accord, 1985, p.B s.45). Finally, it states 
that the financing of these self-government agreements 
should be negotiated in a way that promotes equal 
opportunity and furthers social, economic, and cultural 
development (Charlottetown Accord, 1985, p. B s.50). 
The Charlottetown Accord, despite its failure, identified 
certain key policy areas, notably culture, identity, and 
institutions that should frame any assessment of an 
Indigenous self-government regime.
 Scholarship on Indigenous self-government 
further clarifies the vision set forth in the Charlottetown 
Accord. Dan Russell identifies the Penner Report3 as 
the impetus for self-government and the importance 
of its recommendations for “expanded jurisdiction of 
first nations governments, the exclusion of provincial 
jurisdiction from Indigenous lands, and a process of First 
Nations accountability to Indigenous people” (2000, 
7). Furthermore, he argues that if self-government has 
any content at all it must mean the ability to enact 
laws concerning crime, health care, and education all 
enforceable by Indigenous courts (Russell, 2000, 11). 
In this argument, Russell asserts that First Nations 
governments must have their own judicial enforcement 
mechanisms to execute their own legislation.
3 In 1983, a Special Parliamentary Committee on Indian Self-
government released The Penner Report, named after its chairman, 
Keith Penner, a Liberal Member of Parliament for Cochrane-
Superior. The Report recommended that Canada’s Indian Act 
and the Department of Indian Affairs be phased out  gradually 
and replaced by local governments established by Native peoples 
themselves.
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 Wayne Warry takes a different approach to 
Indigenous self-government, proposing that it should 
be up to the First Nations groups to determine the 
legitimate parameters of self-government (1998, 36). 
He argues that self-government is an iterative process 
in which its meaning becomes clearer through its 
implementation and practice (1998, 49). Warry’s 
approach differs greatly from Russell’s and he seeks to 
grant agency to Indigenous peoples in their specific 
contexts to determine what their legitimate form of self-
government will mean given the needs of their individual 
communities. Warry does not provide criteria in the 
way Russell does, but nonetheless helps inform what 
Indigenous self-government would look like in saying 
that it recognizes the right and ability of individuals and 
communities to conduct their own affairs (1998, 50).
 Tim Schouls provides further clarity to the 
question of what Indigenous self-government will and 
ought to mean on the ground. Firstly, he states that self-
government should be principally to preserve Indigenous 
culture (Schouls, 2003, 45). While cultural preservation 
should be the chief concern of any self-government 
regime, Schouls clarifies by stating, “Self government is 
understood to be fundamentally about the expression 
of an Indigenous desire for control over internal affairs” 
(2003, 178). This is an important stipulation in Schouls’ 
statement as it implies a degree of autonomy from the 
Canadian state that extends the tribe’s authority only 
to members of the tribe and to matters that are internal 
to their own community. In this, Schouls argues for a 
degree of separation between Indigenous communities 
and the Canadian state. 
 Viewed together, the Charlottetown Accord 
and the scholarly literature on the topic help clarify 
what Indigenous self-government should look like 
on the ground. The guiding principle identified in 
all the sources is Indigenous control over Indigenous 
affairs, and a distancing from the federal and provincial 
governments from business that is internal to First 
Nations communities. More specifically, self-government 
agreements ought to include provisions for Indigenous 
control over language, culture, economy, identity, 
institutions, traditions, and land. Furthermore, as 
Russell asserts, these agreements ought to include 
enforcement mechanisms, whether they be courts or 
other institutions, to enforce laws made by Indigenous 
governments. After outlining his principles, Russell 
asserts that the real question is not what Indigenous self-
government ought to look like, but “can it be done?” 
(2000, 89). By examining the Nisga’a Treaty, I argue that 
Russell’s question can be answered in the affirmative.
The Nisga’a Treaty Agreement
The Nisga’a Treaty agreement is the first modern-
day treaty in British Columbia and in this it is novel 
(Cassidy, 2004, 5). Given its novelty, it is imperative 
to adjudicate the success of this paradigm based on the 
theoretical principles identified in the preceding section. 
In adjudicating the success of the agreement, I break 
up my analysis into criteria identified in the literature 
on self-government. The eight categories provided in 
the literature to judge the success of the Nisga’a Treaty 
are: general provisions, government structure, social 
services, the judiciary, language and culture, lands and 
assets, citizenship, and financing. By identifying how the 
treaty addresses Nisga’a government on these issues and 
adjudicating them based on the criteria established by 
the relevant literature, it is possible to ascertain the value 
of the Nisga’a agreement. Any study of the Nisga’a treaty 
that ignores the actual text of the agreement would be 
incomplete. Based largely on the text of the agreement, 
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in this section I assess how well it fits with the criteria 
established in the Charlottetown Accord and the relevant 
scholarship.
 Chapter two of the Nisga’a agreement sets out 
certain general conditions that help frame it. Firstly, the 
agreement does not alter the Constitution of Canada 
and exists within the meaning of Sections 25 and 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982 (Canada et. al. ch.2 s.1). The 
Charter will still apply to Nisga’a governments, bearing 
in mind “the free and democratic nature of Nisga’a 
Government” (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.2 s.9). Finally, 
while federal and provincial laws will still apply to the 
Nisga’a, in the event of a conflict between these laws and 
the agreement, the agreement will prevail (Canada et. al., 
1999, ch.2 s.13). These principles set the groundwork 
for the rest of the agreement and support the supremacy 
of the self-government agreement over any piece of 
provincial or federal legislation. 
 One key principle identified in the literature 
is that Indigenous governments ought to have control 
over their institutions and governmental structures. 
The agreement addresses this. The Nisga’a have the 
jurisdiction to make laws concerning the establishment 
of Nisga’a institutions (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11, s. 
34). This includes the composition of their government, 
its financial administration, and the conduct of 
elections and referenda. The provisions for the Nisga’a 
constitution enumerated in Chapter 11, Section Nine 
are relatively vague, allowing for Nisga’a autonomy in 
these areas. For example, while it mandates that the 
Nisga’a provide a mechanism for challenging Nisga’a 
laws it does not codify what this mechanism should 
look like or establish a settler standard to which it 
should conform (Canada et al.). In this way, it sets up 
guiding principles but leaves the practical administration 
of these issues up to the Nisga’a and their members. 
This method of structuring the Nisga’a government 
allows for a relatively high degree of Nisga’a autonomy, 
which is consistent with notions in the literature of 
self-government as a process that must be determined 
by Indigenous communities themselves.  Furthermore, 
the Nisga’a right to self-government is constitutionally 
entrenched through this treaty, which means that 
it cannot be ignored by the province or the federal 
government (Cassidy, 2004, 8). The structure of the 
Nisga’a government in general conforms to the standards 
evoked by the literature by recognizing self-government 
as an iterative process that is valuable to the extent that 
First Nations groups have the autonomy to determine 
their own internal constitutional structures.
 The way the Nisga’a agreement addresses social 
services provides an illustrative criterion by which 
to judge the degree to which the agreement is self-
government. Generally speaking, the Nisga’a can make 
laws creating social services (Canada et. al, 1999, ch. 11 
s. 78). More specifically, the province and the federal 
government have a responsibility to negotiate with the 
Nisga’a on the administration and delivery of federal 
and provincial social services by the Nisga’a themselves 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s.78). This provision is 
integral to the meaning of self-government because it 
provides Nisga’a control over aspects of government 
that are central to the well-being of Nisga’a members. 
Furthermore, the agreement specifically addresses health 
care, stating that the Nisga’a and the governments 
will negotiate to reach agreement for health care for 
individuals on the reserve, and in the instance that any 
Nisga’a law regarding the structure or organization of 
health services on Nisga’a lands contravenes federal or 
provincial law, Nisga’a law will prevail (Canada et. al., 
1999, ch.11 s.84). Furthermore, the Nisga’a have the 
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ability to regulate Indigenous healers on the reserve, 
however they cannot regulate substances that are already 
regulated by the federal or provincial governments 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 86). This provision is 
mixed in terms of the degree to which it allows self-
government. Similarly mixed are the ways the agreement 
provides for education on reserve. While the Nisga’a can 
make laws regarding preschool to grade-12 education, 
which includes the teaching of Nisga’a language and 
culture, there are standards set forth by the province 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 100). Not only must 
the Nisga’a education system prepare its graduates 
to competently attend post-secondary education, it 
must also permit the transfer of students to provincial 
schools at each grade level (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 
11 s. 100). These provisions provide checks along the 
way on Nisga’a education that reduce the ability of the 
Nisga’a to innovate. But generally, Nisga’a language 
and culture can be taught concurrently with provincial 
standards provided students in each grade can achieve 
at similar levels to students at provincially operated 
schools. The vernacular surrounding the standards 
by which the Nisga’a must conform to the province’s 
regulation is very important in determining the 
degree of Nisga’a autonomy. In terms of Nisga’a post-
secondary institutions, the Treaty calls only for standards 
“comparable” to those of the province on issues of 
organization, admissions, instructor qualifications, 
and curriculum (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s. 104). 
Since Nisga’a standards need only be comparable to the 
province’s, there is a degree of autonomy in this domain. 
Overall, the provisions for social services in the Nisga’a 
agreement are generally amenable to the principles 
identified in the literature and provide for a system that 
gives the Nisga’a a relatively high degree of autonomy in 
regulating health services and education.
 As Russell argues, Indigenous law enforcement 
is required for any Indigenous self-government regime 
to be legitimate (2000, 11). The Nisga’a treaty fulfils this 
requirement to a certain extent but falls down in certain 
key areas. The Nisga’a have the jurisdiction to make laws 
regulating or controlling actions on their land other 
than actions that are authorized by the Crown or actions 
that may constitute “nuisance, a trespass, a danger to 
public health, or a threat to public order, peace, or 
safety” (Canada et. al., ch.11 s. 59). The words in this 
section are relatively vague, which makes it difficult 
to adjudicate this section. Despite this ambiguity, the 
Nisga’a do not have the authority to create criminal law 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 61). This is a significant 
limit to Nisga’a judicial abilities. Furthermore, the 
Nisga’a may not regulate gambling on their lands, which 
is another infringement on the theoretical notions of 
self-government (Canada et. al, 1999, ch.11 s. 108). 
Despite these inadequacies in the treaty, Chapter 12, 
which describes the “Administration of Justice,” provides 
a clearer framework for Nisga’a judicial mechanisms. 
This chapter provides for the Nisga’a to create their own 
police force (Canada et. al. 1999, ch. 12 s.4). While the 
force must be in “substantial conformity” to provincial 
standards in terms of use of force by its officers and 
codes of conduct, the treaty provides for a large degree 
of autonomy in this area (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 
12 s.4). Furthermore, these police officers have all the 
powers and responsibilities of peace officers under the 
law (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.12 s.13). There is also a 
reciprocal system whereby provincial police officers must 
notify the Nisga’a police forces if they are performing 
their duties in Nisga’a territory and vice versa (Canada 
et. al., 1999, ch. 12 s.14-15). These sections set up a 
notion of equality between the two police forces, which 
symbolizes the equal status of the Nisga’a and provincial 
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governments. Furthermore, the provisions whereby the 
police force must be in substantial conformity with the 
provinces provide not so much a limit on police power 
as they do protection of citizens’ rights.
 Not only can the Nisga’a establish a police 
force with a relative degree of autonomy they are also 
capable of establishing a system of courts provided they 
comply with “generally recognized principles in respect 
of judicial fairness, independence and impartiality 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 12 s.33). This section sets 
forth criteria that are theoretical and non-specific, 
which gives the Nisga’a a large degree of autonomy 
in terms of the structure of their judicial system. This 
autonomy affirms the theoretical principles of self-
government. Furthermore, the Nisga’a courts have 
powers that are relatively far reaching. They can review 
Nisga’a institutions, adjudicate based on Nisga’a law, and 
adjudicate disputes within the jurisdiction of provincial 
courts provided it is on Nisga’a land and involves Nisga’a 
people. While the Nisga’a are unable to make criminal 
law and are limited in their legislative ability on certain 
other legal issues, the Treaty does set up enforcement 
mechanisms that afford the Nisga’a a large degree of 
autonomy. While the judicial set-up under the Nisga’a 
agreement may not totally fulfil Russell’s criteria, it does 
a respectable job in setting up autonomy for Nisga’a 
courts and police forces to enforce Nisga’a law in Nisga’a 
territory. 
 The criterion that is mentioned most commonly 
in the literature as a litmus test for self-government is 
the degree to which the Indigenous governments are 
autonomous in matters of culture. On this issue, the 
Nisga’a agreement is relatively strong. The agreement 
states outright that “Nisga’a language and culture are 
matters that should be subject to Nisga’a laws and 
governments, to as great an extent as possible” (Cassidy, 
2004, 19). The Nisga’a have the authority to make laws 
that promote and preserve their culture and language 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s.41). Specifically, this 
clause allows the Nisga’a to pass laws to authorize the 
use, reproduction, and representation of Nisga’a cultural 
symbols and practices, and the teaching of Nisga’a 
language (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s.41).  While 
this provision is broad and gives the Nisga’a a large 
degree of autonomy, it does not allow the Nisga’a to 
legislate regarding intellectual property (Canada et. al., 
1999 ch.11 s.42). On this issue, the treaty is potentially 
lacking in terms of its protection of Nisga’a culture but 
other sections provide the Nisga’a with greater power. 
For instance, the Nisga’a can control the devolution 
of cultural property for people who die intestate and 
Nisga’a governments can make laws forcing employers 
to accommodate Nisga’a employees based on aspects of 
Nisga’a culture (Canada et al., 1999, ch. 11 s. 115-16). 
These provisions give the Nisga’a government control 
over cultural materials and give Nisga’a residents a 
greater ability to practice their culture. Chapter 17 sets 
out the procedures by which the Nisga’a can reclaim 
Nisga’a artifacts from the Canadian Museum of History 
and the Royal British Columbia Museum. Chapter nine 
also sets out provisions for the traditional Nisga’a harvest 
of wildlife in the Nass Wildlife Reserve subject only to 
provincial legislation for public health and conservation 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 17 s.1). This provision does 
not require the Nisga’a to obtain hunting licenses 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 17 s.10). These provisions 
allow for the reclamation of cultural artifacts and the 
practice of traditional Nisga’a hunting rituals that allow 
the Nisga’a to regulate their own traditional cultural 
practices. While the agreement does not delegate the 
ability to legislate based on state intellectual property 
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laws, it does delegate autonomy in other important areas 
and extends the Nisga’a ability to control and practice 
their culture.
 Like cultural considerations, issues concerning 
land assets are frequently mentioned by scholars 
identifying criteria by which to adjudicate Indigenous 
self-government. The agreement states that the Nisga’a 
can make laws regarding the use and management of 
their lands (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s.44). These laws 
have a wide jurisdiction under Section 44 and include 
the right to control how land is disposed of on Nisga’a 
territory (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 S. 44,d). They have 
the ability to regulate business on their land and can 
zone, plan, and develop their land as they see fit (Canada 
et. al., 1999, ch.11 s.47). Furthermore, the same criteria 
for bird harvest in Chapter nine are made in Chapter 
eight for fish harvest. The Nisga’a have the right to fish 
on their lands subject only to provincial legislation on 
public health and conservation and do not require a 
government license (Canada et. al., 1999 , ch. 8 s.1, s.7). 
Generally speaking, the Nisga’a treaty allows for a large 
degree of autonomy in Nisga’a legislation on the use of 
Nisga’a land and resources. This is consistent with the 
criteria set out by the scholarship identified earlier. 
 Citizenship—that is, who is Nisga’a and who is 
not—is an important part of any Indigenous agreement. 
The criteria for citizenship are set forth in Chapter 20 
of the agreement and are relatively restrictive. Nisga’a 
citizens must be of Nisga’a ancestry either by being 
born to a mother in the tribe, a descendant of such an 
individual, an adopted child of a woman in the tribe, 
or the spouse of one of said people (Canada et. al., 
1999, ch.9 S.1). These criteria are relatively restrictive 
because they are based on an ancestral link to the Nisga’a 
people. Furthermore, the Nisga’a have the authority 
to form an enrolment committee, one governed by 
rules set out by the Nisga’a council that will adjudicate 
cases of membership (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.9 s.11). 
This effectively allows the Nisga’a to regulate their 
membership and thus regulate access to Nisga’a lands 
and the privileges of Nisga’a citizenship. This internal 
mechanism whereby the Nisga’a can control membership 
is integral to a the safeguarding of all other Nisga’a rights 
under the agreement. There is an Appeal Board that 
adjudicates references from the Enrolment Committee 
and the appeals board is composed of Nisga’a and 
government officials in equal numbers (Canada et. 
al., 1999, s. 19 ch.9). The appeals process privileges 
the Nisga’a and allows for the pre-eminence of Nisga’a 
decision-making at all levels. It creates a framework of 
self-government that encourages Nisga’a autonomy in 
the critical area of membership.
 While the agreement seems to satisfy notions 
of self-government in crucial areas defined by scholars, 
issues of financing are paramount to the practical 
implementation of this agreement. With regard to 
financing, the agreement sets forth a process that is very 
fair to the Nisga’a. Chapter 15 describes the financing 
agreement and states that every five years the parties 
agree to negotiate financing that would enable the 
agreed-upon public programs and services to Nisga’a 
residents at levels that are reasonably comparable to 
those in northwest British Columbia (Canada et. al., 
1999, ch. 15 s.3). This sets a relatively high standard 
by which the province and the federal government 
must provide financing to the Nisga’a government. 
Furthermore, these calculations will take into account 
the costs necessary to establish and operate the Nisga’a 
government, the effectiveness of public programs, the 
location of Nisga’a lands, training requirements, Nisga’a 
cultural values, and the obligations of the Nisga’a 
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government (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.15 s.9). This 
clause widens the scope of the financing arrangement 
taking into account important considerations that help 
ensure the ability of the Nisga’a government to operate. 
By taking into account the remoteness of Nisga’a 
lands and Nisga’a cultural values, the agreement is 
sensitive to the Nisga’a situation and helps facilitate self-
government. While the Nisga’a have the power to tax 
their own citizens (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 16 s.1), the 
Nisga’a are also subject to governmental taxes—federal 
and provincial (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 16 s.6). The 
subjection to governmental taxes is one that contravenes 
the Indian Act but does not contravene the jurisdiction 
of the Nisga’a government. In this way, while it may 
be less than ideal for Nisga’a residents, taxation is not 
necessarily an issue that lessens the degree to which the 
agreement fulfils the notion of self-government. 
 Based on the text of the agreement, the Nisga’a 
treaty fulfils to a large extent the theoretical principles 
identified in the literature on self-government. The 
Nisga’a have prevailing jurisdiction in several substantial 
areas including government, citizenship, culture, 
language, lands and assets, the organization and 
structure of health services, child and family services, 
and education (Cassidy, 2004, 10). Furthermore, the 
agreement clarifies that the Nisga’a have the authority 
to make laws that are necessarily incidental to exercising 
their authority as set out by the agreement (Canada 
et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 126). While occasionally the 
agreement stipulates that the state can regulate Nisga’a 
government or that the Nisga’a cannot legislate on 
certain issues, the agreement largely fulfils the theoretical 
principles evoked in the relevant literature. In this 
way, the Nisga’a acquire law-making authority in the 
crucial areas of “lands, language, culture, education, 
health, child protection, traditional healing practices, 
fisheries, wildlife, forestry, environmental protection, 
and policing” (Allen, 2004, 235). While the actual text 
of the agreement is consistent with the principles of 
Indigenous self-government, the practical reality of how 
the agreement is implemented is just as (if not more) 
important.
 A 2010 study by Joseph Quesnel and Conrad 
Winn reports mixed results as to the effect of the 
agreement on the quality of governance within the 
Nisga’a community. They find that the funding from 
the government is sufficient for the operation of Nisga’a-
run programs and that there is higher trust for the local 
Nisga’a government than neighboring bands have for 
their own governmental arrangements (Quesnel et. 
al., 2011, 9). Despite this seemingly positive feedback, 
they find no improvement in public opinion over the 
government’s ability to keep promises, though there are 
large concerns about nepotism among Nisga’a leadership 
(Quesnel et. al., 2011, 11-12). Furthermore, they state 
that there is difficulty for many members of the group 
to live outside of the Indian Act framework (Quesnel 
et. al., 2011, 16). Despite these mixed results, what we 
understand as good government and as self-government 
should not be conflated. While the immediate results of 
the agreement are mixed as to their impact on improving 
governance, the agreement provides a workable 
framework for Nisga’a self-government, which is an 
essentially positive goal. While the short-term effects 
of self-government in the Nisga’a community may be 
mixed, the creation of a workable regime for Indigenous 
self-government within the current constitutional 
framework is a notable accomplishment and a step 
toward Indigenous self-government on a larger scale 
that, as the literature demonstrates, is an essential step in 
the advancement of Canadian Indigenous peoples. 
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 In conclusion, the question of how Indigenous 
peoples should rightly interact with the state is one 
that has prompted a vast amount of scholarship and 
political discussion. The Nisga’a Treaty provides the 
framework for an answer to the question of how 
Canadian First Nations fit into the federal system. The 
Nisga’a agreement does not provide for self-government 
on every issue and, in some areas, there are standards 
imposed by the provincial and federal governments. 
But in most areas, the agreement mostly adheres to the 
theoretical ideals proposed in the Charlottetown Accord 
and in literature on self-government. While theory is 
useful for crafting frameworks, policy that is negotiated 
by three “orders” of government is rarely ideal. In this 
way, the Nisga’a agreement provides a valuable example 
for how Indigenous self-government can be realized 
within the current constitutional framework to a degree 
that substantially conforms to theoretical ideals. While 
the practical implementation of the agreement has had 
mixed effects in its improvement of governance for the 
Nisga’a, good governance and self-government should 
not be conflated, and self-government is a goal unto 
itself for Indigenous peoples in Canada.  While the 
Nisga’a agreement is somewhat exceptional in that it 
was instituted in an environment made conducive to 
compromise by provincial and federal governments, it 
still provides a model for future negotiations (Cassidy, 
2004, 24). As Wayne Warry states, “Self-government 
is an emergent, iterative process—its meaning and 
validity become clearer with its practice” (1998, 49). 
In implementing the Nisga’a agreement, Canadian 
governments are supporting a forward-looking process 
that is consistent with theoretical, ideal principles and 
workable in the current constitutional context.
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The North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA): 
Potential Changes, 
Effects, and What to Do 
Concerning the Trucking 
Industry
SHYLA STOKES WITH RICHARD STUMPENHAGEN
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was established in 1994 to enable various industries to remain competitive in the North American market and to increase 
trilateral trade among Canada, Mexico, and the United 
States. Since Donald Trump came into office as President 
of the United States, there has been potential for reform 
of NAFTA, and the impact needs to be examined (North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)). The impact 
of NAFTA on the trucking industry is explored in this 
study, as the majority of trilateral trade is conducted 
by trucks crossing borders, which requires freedom of 
transit. 
 President Trump intends to renegotiate trade 
agreements, especially with Canada and Mexico.1 
Through these negotiations, the United States seeks to 
support higher-paying jobs in the United States and to 
grow the U.S. economy by improving U.S. opportunities 
to trade with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA). On the 
other hand, “Mexico has asked the United States to 
allow its trucks on U.S. roads, and [this] was promised 
in the first NAFTA agreement but withdrawn by the 
U.S. Congress, so Mexico is also looking for an anti-
corruption clause” (Amadeo, 2018). Mexico and Canada 
do not share the same concerns. Canada is looking for 
the end of tariffs from the United States on products 
such as lumber and dairy. Those areas would impact 
trade and have a trickle effect on the trucking industry, 
although changes are not likely since there has not been 
much progress in the negotiation meetings (Amadeo, 
2018). It has also been said “that upwards of 60% of 
NAFTA trade is truck-based … so there is probably little 
replacement for this trade coming from anywhere since 
these are the U.S. land borders,” although rail would 
be the second leading mode (US Trade Experts, 2017). 
Taking into account all of this information, this research 
explores which aspects of NAFTA would be affected 
more than others in a renegotiation. This study uses a 
strategic audit approach to make recommendations that 
seek to keep trucking companies involved in trade and 
with NAFTA.
Current Performance 
According to the United States Department of 
Transportation, as of May 2015, 31.4 million trucks 
were registered and used for business purposes (“Reports, 
Trends & Statistics,” 2015). Internationally, trucks 
transported 58.3% of the value of trade between the 
U.S. and Canada in 2015 and 70.9% of trade between 
the U.S. and Mexico. The value of truck-transported 
1 Editors’ note. This essay was written in early Spring 2018, months 
before the October 2018 conclusion of negotiations resulting in 
the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), the 
successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
This scholarship provides scholarly insight into the subject that was 
available at that moment.
18 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018 BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY
trade increased 4.4% to $376.6 billion with Mexico. 
With Canada, the value slipped 5.3% to $335.2 billion, 
but there were also gross freight revenues of $726.4 
billion (“Reports, Trends & Statistics,” 2015). In 2016, 
NAFTA generated a lot of cross-border trade, which was 
found to be worth $89 billion to the trucking industry 
(Roberts, 2017). With revenues come expenses, and 
taxes in 2014 included $39.9 billion paid by commercial 
trucks in federal and state highway user taxes. 
Employment performance in 2014 and 2015 included 
7.3 million people employed in trucking-related jobs, 
3.5 million of whom were truck drivers (“Reports, 
Trends & Statistics,” 2015).
 The purpose of the research was to investigate 
NAFTA negotiations and what could result from them 
for the trucking industry. Various methods were used, 
including organizational and industry analyses and 
Porter’s Five Forces. Porter’s Five Forces are the (a) threat 
of new entrants, (b) rivalry among firms, (c) substitute 
services, (d) bargaining power of buyers, and (e) power 
of suppliers. Those forces are used to explore the fact 
that “a corporation is most concerned with the intensity 
of competition within its industry, [and] the level of 
this intensity is determined by competitive forces, [and] 
the collective strength of these forces determines the 
ultimate profit potential in the industry” (Wheelen, 
Hunger, Hoffman, & Bamford, 2015, 104). The 
industry is scanned, and the corporation must assess the 
importance to its success of the five forces. The stronger 
the forces, the more limited companies become, but 
weaker forces can become opportunities for companies 
(Wheelen et al, 2015).
Threat of New Entrants
“New entrants to an industry typically bring to it new 
capacity, a desire to gain market share, and potentially 
substantial resources” (Wheelen et al, 2015, 105). It is 
not difficult to enter the industry when the barriers to 
entry—or the “obstructions that make it difficult for a 
company to enter an industry”—are low, but one must 
keep in mind that trucking is a lifestyle with a large 
initial investment and costs throughout. However, those 
costs do not keep many away from trucking (Wheelen et 
al, 2015, 105; Delco, 2015).
Rivalry Among Firms
There are roughly 500,000 trucking companies in 
the US. The most obvious component of trucking 
competition is within the US, as many companies are 
capable of performing the same duties. Efficiency and 
effectiveness are the determining factors. Small, medium, 
and large trucking companies face similar issues, but 
larger companies have an easier time executing their 
duties and can exhaust more resources because there are 
more opportunities to determine what works and what 
does not (“Five Frequently Asked Questions,” 2010).
Substitute Service(s)
A substitute service is one that does not look like the 
particular service in demand, but will satisfy in the 
same way to fulfill the customer needs (Wheelan et al, 
2015). There are not a lot of substitutes to trucking, 
but rail and air services are often utilized in conjunction 
with trucking. Companies use “truck and rail or truck 
and air for ultimate delivery to the customer,” with rail 
being slower and air being faster (“Competition Drives 
Trucking Industry,” 1998; “International Shipping 
Costs,” 2018). 
Bargaining Power of Buyers
In most cases, buyers have the ability to affect an 
industry because they have the power to change prices. 
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Buyers force prices down when their demand decreases; 
suppliers cannot sell their products otherwise. Buyers 
can demand higher-quality products and more services. 
They also can play the competitors against each other 
(Wheelen et al, 2015). Buyers may be able to lower the 
cost of shipping, especially when threatening to use 
another product or supplier.
Power of Suppliers
Suppliers have more power than some would think, 
and this power can affect the industry. Suppliers have 
the power to raise prices and/or reduce the quality of 
goods and services (Wheelen et al, 2015). Although 
suppliers can technically raise prices, given the implied 
number of suppliers in the trucking industry, this would 
not be wise. If costs are passed on to consumers, there 
is potential for the cost of shipping to increase. In that 
case, the cost of the service rendered is likely to increase 
as well. This would make for an unfortunate chain 
reaction.
Methodology
This study is a synthesis of information found from 
scanning and assessing the external environment of 
the trucking industry, and it examines what a specific 
company’s internal environment would be like. From 
the facts presented in each analysis, recommendations 
are made in order to address any issues going forward. 
Both the external and internal factor analysis tables 
below, which resemble a detailed S.W.O.T (strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis, present 
information about the trucking industry, which factor 
into trucking organizations, and whether they are 
helping or hindering the business. The tables give 
a visual representation of each factor, which has a 
weight and rating that are then multiplied to arrive 
at the weighted score. The weights are out of 1 (Most 
Important) with 0 being the least; they give a rating 
of the importance and level of impact of the factor 
in regard to the company’s current and future success 
(Wheelen et al, 2015). The rating is on a scale of 0 to 5 
with 5 being the best in regard to how well the industry 
or organization is responding to the factor(s). The 
comments are the explanations of those factors (Wheelen 
et al, 2015).
Industry Analysis
External opportunities and threats are used to study the 
trucking industry and what is helping or hindering the 
companies. When using this information, it is important 
to determine what is helping and hindering by assigning 
these factors to opportunities or threats respectively.
 Based on the findings and calculations above, 
it can be noted that the threats have a greater impact 
than the opportunities. However, threats can be turned 
into opportunities if done so properly. When thinking 
of these external factors in a visual sense, one might 
consider a metaphorical seesaw. Where there is an 
opportunity for more jobs and increased revenue, there 
is also the threatening potential that jobs could be lost 
and revenue lost. This is because results of NAFTA 
cannot be thoroughly predicted without weighing both 
sides of every scenario. Furthermore, the proposed 
changes to NAFTA are more likely to harm the US 
agreement with Mexico than with Canada, so a threat 
to Mexico can be deemed an opportunity for Canada. 
The people working in the trucking industry are not the 
only ones who have concerns; consumers are affected as 
well because some goods and services are not important 
enough to some consumers to keep paying increases in 
prices. Even if consumers are able to pay, they may not 
necessarily be content to do so. The factors presented 
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External 
Factors
Weight Rating Weighted 
Score
Comments
Opportunities        
Potential for 
more jobs








.10 3 .3 400% increase since NAFTA was implemented, 
potential for more growth.
Help Canada & 
Harm Mexico
.05 2.2 .11 Issues with Mexican border would pose a threat to 
drivers because they would not be able to cross the 
border for trading, but Canada seems to still be able to 
do so and to increase trade relations even more.
Elimination of 
some taxes
.05 2 .1 Potential for some taxes to be cut or eliminated which 
might increase trade and need for trucks.
Threats  
Loss of jobs .15 3 .45 If there is less need for trade, there is less need for truck 
















.10 3.5 .35 Customers might not want to or be able to purchase 
when prices increase. Could specifically harm Mexico 
and avocado trading. 
Total Scores 1.00 3.45  
Table 1: External Factors Analysis
Source: Gillespie (2016), Lawder (2018), Roberts (2017); Schulz (2017), Ending (2018).   
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The findings and calculations above suggest 
that the strengths have a greater impact than the 
weaknesses in the trucking industry. This is opposite to 
the conclusion made concerning the opportunities and 
threats. Strengths are something a company or industry 
already possesses, while an opportunity is something it 
do not necessarily have but can take proper advantage 
of. The focus on the table above is clearly strengths and 
weaknesses, and it is important to take note of the fact 
that the industry has many strong points, but anything 
can happen in this case because the negotiations are still 
happening. 
 Since it is clear that Mexico is likely to be 
harmed more than Canada, most of the weaknesses are 
related to what could happen with Mexico. If Mexico 
is out the agreement, NAFTA really is not the same 
anymore. However, what Canada and the United 
States do with it may still benefit them and would still 
exemplify the strengths and weaknesses above. They may 
be able to lessen their weaknesses and turn them into 
strengths over time. There are many internal factors to 
consider here and it is made clear from the data that 
anything can happen. Nonetheless, if everything remains 
the same, NAFTA could still be successful. If the 
renegotiations lead to great change, then NAFTA could 
fall apart, and these strengths would not be enough 
to keep the industry going, and the weaknesses could 
worsen. 
here are important not only for the industry, but for any 
consumer who knows that the products and services they 
utilize would not exist without a proper trade agreement. 
Reasons like these are why technology and customer 
relations are important. The trucking industry does not 
only need to worry about the agreement from a job and 
revenue standpoint, but also with regard to the other 
factors that affect the industry, such as technology and 
customers, all of which have a bearing on jobs. NAFTA 
may have been doing well these past few years with great 
increases in trade, but that does not mean it will remain. 
A lot of the external factors can and are likely to change, 
and as can be seen in the table above, those changes can 
either benefit or harm the industry. 
Organizational Analysis
Internal strengths and weaknesses are used to study the 
specific factors related to the trucking industry. Each 
sector is determined to be a strength or weakness to 
aid in the evaluation of what is helping or hindering 
the company and why. Internal information makes it 
easier to pinpoint room for change and problem areas. 
Companies with the ability to exploit their resources 
have greater capabilities. Those closer to the border 
are likely to garner more business if their performance 
has been positive. Companies that are able to provide 
good client service and anticipate consequences, 
while also demonstrating great risk management, 
have excellent core competencies (White, 2016). 
Competitive advantages include knowing how to 
maximize the market and how to use good marketing 
with clear objectives (White, 2016). It is easier for 
larger companies than for an independent worker to 
gain the resources and capabilities necessary to support 
a competitive challenge. It is less challenging for more 
experienced workers to handle customers, trucks, and 
orders because the knowledge is ingrained in them. 
Synergy, or cooperation among those who work for the 
company, those who run the company, and those who 
are delivered to, is important because when companies 
or organizations are able to work together well, processes 
run more smoothly. Synergy is what keeps the trucking 
industry going and growing (Wheelen et al, 2015). 
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Table 2: Internal Factors Analysis
Internal 
Factors
Weight Rating Weighted 
Score
Comments








.15 4 .6 Regulations put in place to ensure safety.
Highly 
Integrated




.10 3.5 .35 Trade relationship is good but could deteriorate soon.
Movement of 
goods is key





.15 2 .3 Cannot go further than 20 mi from the border; 
otherwise trucks do not meet US safety standards.
Highly 
sensitive 
.15 3.5 .53 Sensitive to any disruption in industry.
Subject to 
fallout
.05 3.7 .19 If Mexico, loss of all relations and revenue. If Canada, 
could suffer from the US-Mexico fallout. Mexico and 
Canada are highly integrated.
Global 
Positioning
.10 2.2 .22 Hard to cross border, let alone keep relations with 
Canada if US leaves.
Not Internet 
Based
.05 2 .1 Internet Commerce on the rise.
Total Scores 1.00 3.35  
Source: Amadeo (2018), Roberts (2017), Yeung (2017).
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Strategies would include increasing the domestic 
customer base in each respective country, which would 
mean more coast-to-coast transportation in the US; 
however, that would increase competition with rail 
service. Such a change would favor trucking companies 
that are able to adapt in business. Consumers would still 
receive the goods they need; however, the US does not 
produce as many goods as are consumed, meaning it 
would cost more to acquire them. Although this strategy 
has its positive aspects as expressed above, there are 
setbacks as well. The setbacks would be a loss in revenue 
to producers and less need for some trucking companies 
by the border, especially the companies involved with 
taking loads from Mexican trucks and transporting them 
from the border.
 A second strategy would be accepting the 
changes and adapting when the proposed tariffs and 
taxes increase. If the border remains open, which is 
likely, there will be constant trade, although there may 
be a slight decrease. When costs increase, generally 
the end consumer is impacted most. NAFTA is vital 
to trucking, which could mean that revenues would 
increase because of the increase in tariffs and taxes and 
allow for job retainment. An example of how these 
changes would affect consumers and the industry is the 
sale of avocados, as they are grown in Mexico. It would 
be harmful to both the US and Mexico if the trading of 
avocados were made almost impossible. Avocados cannot 
easily be grown in the US, yet there is a strong market 
for them, meaning any increase in cost would not deter 
many consumers, especially given the trend among 
millennials of consuming avocado in various forms 
whether, it be on toast or at Mexican restaurants.
Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to perform a strategic 
audit and provide recommendations that the trucking 
industry could utilize in regard to the changes 
in NAFTA, whether the treaty is renegotiated or 
eliminated. The major finding in regard to renegotiation 
is that taxes and tariffs would likely increase; the 
recommended course of action would be to take the 
changes and adapt and keep a close eye on NAFTA 
negotiations. Organizations within the trucking industry 
must also create several contingencies. NAFTA will 
most likely be kept in some shape or form. However, 
the cost of shipping will be increased if tariffs and taxes 
are increased, affecting consumers and causing difficult 
issues for products in lower demand. Another way to 
adapt to the changes without deterring the organization 
too much would be to lobby Congress intensely. If the 
trucking industry puts enough pressure on Congress, 
they may not enact certain changes. 
Results: Strategy Formulation
The focus here is to pinpoint the most important 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in order 
to explore the external and internal factor combination. 
This aids in the selecting of the most promising strategies 
in order to help the company. Strengths are used to 
exploit opportunities in order to have the company gain 
the best results. The Strategy Formulation Analysis table 
below is used to provide a visual representation summary 
of the most important factors from the internal and 
external factor analysis tables. Each factor is specified as 
a strength, weakness, opportunity, or threat once again, 
but the rating for each factor remains the same, with 
the weight being altered to make sure the total equals 
1 (Wheelen et al, 2015). From this table strategies are 
formulated in order to make recommendations for 
dealing with any issues at hand. In this case, that would 
be NAFTA renegotiations. 
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Table 3: Strategy Formulation Analysis





.10 4.3 .43 Elements are properly coordinated, easier to 
meet needs.
S5 Movement of 
goods is key
.10 4.8 .48 One of the only options to move goods; 
promotes economic success.
W1 Mile Restriction .10 2 .2 Cannot go further than 20 mi from the 
border (MEX); otherwise trucks do not meet 
US safety standards.
W2 Highly sensitive .15 3.5 .53 Sensitive to any disruption in industry.
O1 Potential for 
more jobs




.10 4.2 .42 Not much change, only improvements. 
O3 Increase in cross-
border trade
.10 3 .3 400% increase since NAFTA was 
implemented, with potential for more 
growth.
T1 Loss of jobs .15 3 .45 If there is less need for trade, there is less 
need for truck drivers. If the industry is 
dwindling, then they will have less work. 
T2 Loss of revenues .10 3.4 .34 Increased fees leads to loss of customers. 
Lower sales = less use for trucks and lower 
revenue.
Total Scores 1.00 3.55  
Source: Amadeo (2018), Roberts (2017), Schulz (2017).
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 The companies that will be most impacted by 
renegotiation or elimination of NAFTA are those that 
specialize in cross-border trucking. This industry is 
highly sensitive to change, and until a clearer picture 
emerges of where renegotiation might go, companies 
must be prepared for several alternatives: reduced 
business, no business, or business as usual. Jobs will 
be lost if the cost of shipping is too high because 
eventually consumers will be unwilling to pay. The 
potential changes to NAFTA are more likely to harm the 
consumers than the industry, but trucking companies 
cannot remain successful without customers. This is a 
new era with President Trump in office, and a lot can 
occur, particularly in regard to NAFTA. The research 
presented here shows that essentially anything can 
happen. That said, it looks like what will happen is not 
too harmful for the trucking industry. It is important 
to note the relevance and importance of any changes 
because NAFTA has been in place since the 1990s and 
trade is a major form of commerce. 
Limitations
Given the short amount of time President Trump had 
been in office at the time of this research, and given 
that the talks about NAFTA are fairly new, there were 
limitations to the research. They include a lack of 
available data and lack of prior research on the topic. 
Many of the information explored does not pertain to 
the trucking industry specifically, or does not pertain 
to NAFTA, both necessary for the case at hand. There 
is not a lot of literature on the topic yet because the 
renegotiations have only been occurring for a few 
months. Although there are news articles and various 
sources explaining what is happening, the topic is subject 
to frequent changes. 
26 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018 BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY
Shyla Stokes graduated 
from Bridgewater State 
University in May 2018 
with a Bachelor’s degree in 
Accounting and Finance, 
with a concentration in 
Accounting and minors in 
Management and Sociology. She is currently continuing 
her education at Bridgewater, working toward a Master of 
Science of Accountancy. 
References
Amadeo, K. 2018. “What happens if Trump dumps 
NAFTA.” Retrieved from https://www.
thebalance.com/donald-trump-nafta-4111368
“Competition drives the trucking industry.” 1998. 
Retrieved from https://www.bls.gov/opub/
mlr/1998/04/art3full.pdf 
Delco, B. 201). “Trucking industry: Supply constraints 
will create a secular change in competitive 





“Five frequently asked questions about truck drivers and 




Gillespie, P. 2016. “NAFTA: What it is, and why Trump 
hates it.” Retrieved from http://money.cnn.
com/2016/11/15/news/economy/trump-what-is-
nafta/index.html
“International shipping costs for transport by road, 
sea, rail and air.” 2018. Retrieved from https://
www.allianceexperts.com/en/knowledge/
transportation-for-international-trade/
Lawder, D. 2018. “Trump says NAFTA talks going 





27 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY
“US trade experts: Carving NAFTA bad for American 
truckers too.” 2017. Retrieved from http://
ontruck.org/us-trade-experts-carving-nafta-bad-
for-american-truckers-too/
Wheelen, T. L., Hunger, J. D., Hoffman, A. N., & 
Bamford, C. E. 2015. Strategic Management and 
Business Policy (14th ed.). Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: Pearson.
White, W. 2016. “Distinctive competencies: Examples 
& Pros and Cons.” Retrieved from http://
inevitablesteps.com/business/distinctive-
competencies/
Yeung, C. 2017. “The rise of e-commerce.” Retrieved 
from https://www.sgs.com/en/news/2017/10/
the-rise-of-e-commerce
Magoci, J. 2017. “What are the main traits that make 
a good trucking company?” Retrieved from 
https://www.fueloyal.com/what-are-the-main-
traits-that-make-a-good-trucking-company
“NAFTA: What it is, and why Trump hates it.” 
2016.  Retrieved from http://money.cnn.
com/2016/11/15/news/economy/trump-what-is-
nafta/index.html
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
(n.d.). Retrieved from https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-
american-free-trade-agreement-nafta
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Fact 
Sheet. 2014. Retrieved from https://www.fmcsa.
dot.gov/international-programs/north-american-
free-trade-agreement-nafta-fact-sheet 
“Reports, trends & statistics.” 2015. Retrieved 
from http://www.trucking.org/News_and_
Information_Reports_Industry_Data.aspx
Roberts, J. 2017. “Will Trump’s take on trade be boost 





Schulz, J. D. 2017. “Cross-Border logistics: NAFTA 
tune-up time.” Retrieved from https://www.
logisticsmgmt.com/article/cross_border_
logistics_nafta_tune_up_time
“Trucking industry concerned about NAFTA ending.” 
2018. Retrieved from http://www.ttnews.com/
articles/trucking-industry-concerned-about-
nafta-ending
28 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018 BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY
Renegotiating the Realm of 
Influence: 
The Shifting Priorities of 
President Trump during 
NAFTA Renegotiations
SANFORD JONES
The politics of the President of the United States, Donald Trump, has oscillated be-tween the outward expression of promoting United States (US) economic prosperity and 
an antagonistic populism that seeks to isolate him and 
his followers from established political norms. This has 
recently manifested in the interrelations between domes-
tic influence and foreign policy. Acting upon a campaign 
promise to enter into a renegotiation with Canada and 
Mexico of the 1994 North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), driven by a perception that this could 
improve economic outcomes for the US, the Trump 
Administration began to establish strategic objectives to 
bring to the negotiating table. While the priorities stated 
by the Administration displayed a moderate and sound 
strategy in line with contemporary economists, a shift in 
policy preference occurred once the renegotiation of the 
agreement began. The Trump negotiating team moved 
toward a decidedly more nationalist posture.
This article examines the factors that caused 
that drastic shift in international trade policy. First, 
it addresses the corporate interests that established 
significant influence on the White House. Second, it 
assesses the moderating influence on trade policy that 
followed from this corporate access. Third, it analyzes 
the rationale behind the imbedded corporate interests 
in trade policy and the importance of NAFTA to 
influential American businesses. A contextual analysis 
follows concerning the President’s comments about 
the 2017 Charlottesville, Virginia protests and how 
they affected corporate influence in the White House. 
Next, this essay examines the effects of the dissolution 
of access first granted to corporate interests, followed 
by an analysis of populist nationalism and its impact 
on the Administration’s trade negotiations. Finally, the 
implications of these findings on US foreign policy and 
international relations is considered.
Upon entering the Oval Office, President 
Trump established economic advisory councils replete 
with private-sector expertise. One such council, the 
Strategic and Policy Forum, contained a multitude of 
CEOs with the objective of advising the President “on 
how government policy impacts economic growth, 
job creation, and productivity” (Blackstone 2016). 
Similarly, the President instituted a Manufacturing 
Jobs Initiative, which sought input from CEOs on 
government policy and regulations with the objective to 
“promote job growth and get Americans back to work 
again” (White House 2017b). Upon being appointed 
chairman of the manufacturing council, Dow Chemical 
CEO Andrew Liveris was optimistic that the Trump 
Administration was “not going to do anything to harm 
competitiveness” (quoted in Meyersohn 2017). While 
ostensibly the councils were established to ensure that 
economic policy aligned with the interests of American 
businesses, their ability to increase job growth and 
competitiveness hinged on access to the White House. 
During preparations for the renegotiation of NAFTA, 
the influence of business interests within the councils 
seemed to deliver a moderating effect on the policy of 
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the Trump Administration, which began by seeking 
trade reforms consistent with internationalist economic 
perspectives.
Before the Trump Administration began the 
process of renegotiations with Canadian and Mexican 
officials, it developed strategic approaches and objectives 
for the international meetings. As NAFTA had not 
been updated in the more than two decades, its 
provisions were in need of adjustment, according to 
many economists and scholars.1 The original negotiating 
points set out by the Trump Administration seemed 
to reflect this. There was a reluctance to simply reject 
the agreement, as had been done with the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) (Irwin 2017, 45). In his report 
to Congress, Robert Lighthizer (2017), the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR) for the NAFTA 
renegotiations, outlined a modernization strategy to 
address digital trade, intellectual property, labor, and 
environmental standards. These renegotiation policy 
objectives were not a significant departure from those 
that economic commentators had articulated over the 
course of the agreement’s implementation; indeed, 
the approach taken was notably similar to provisions 
within the proposed TPP (Palmer, Behsudi, and Cassella 
2017). This suggests that the business interests invited 
to advise the White House on economic policy initially 
established a significant influence on international trade 
issues (Neal and Pascrell 2017). The congruence between 
the initial renegotiation provisions, concerns of previous 
US administrations and various expert opinions suggests 
that Trump’s populist campaign rhetoric was initially 
influenced by corporate interests. These interests were 
afforded access to decision-makers through the Strategic 
and Policy Forum and Manufacturing Jobs Initiative 
advisory councils, which gave them an ability to impact 
policy formulation.
 The two advisory councils consisted primarily 
of CEOs from the most profitable and influential 
corporations in the US, and while their interests 
differed on many policy issues, a significant number 
of their members benefit from and support the notion 
of a North American free-trade zone.2 Members 
of the Strategic and Policy Forum involved with 
manufacturing, such as General Motors (GM) and 
General Electric (GE), have a preference for free-
trade policies, especially within the North American 
market. With a former CEO on the Strategic and Policy 
Forum and the current CEO on the Manufacturing 
Jobs Initiative council, GE has been a supportive 
voice for NAFTA renegotiations as a modernization 
attempt (Graham 2017). The position held by GE was 
likely influential; its public positions on NAFTA were 
consistent with the renegotiation objectives presented 
in Lighthizer’s letter to Congress, which highlighted 
the need for reforms in digital trade and intellectual 
1 For recommended reforms to NAFTA see, for example, Hufbauer 
and Schott (2005), Leblond and Fabian (2017), Schoen (1999), or 
Smillie (2017).
2 Among the members of the economic advisory councils are 
financial and manufacturing firms that are involved in transnational 
production in North America and have made statements in support 
of NAFTA; others which neither benefit nor are disadvantaged 
by international trade have mostly remained silent on the issue. 
The major exception is labor. The AFL-CIO and the Alliance for 
American Manufacturing, both represented on the Manufacturing 
Jobs Initiative, have voiced concerns about lower wages and working 
standards in Mexico and insufficient rules of origin to promote US 
manufacturing, respectively (Trumka 2017; Paul 2017).
30 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018 BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY
property (General Electric Company 2017; Lighthizer 
2017). Similarly, GM CEO and Strategic and Policy 
Forum member Mary Barra was critical of intentions 
to impose tariffs on continental trade (Gardner 2017). 
Several investment and consulting firms involved in the 
councils had produced reports noting the disruption 
an abandonment of NAFTA would cause, while also 
inferring the need to modernize the agreement (EY 
2017; Wien 2017; Boston Consulting Group 2017). 
During interviews in April of 2017, CEOs on the 
Strategic and Policy Forum reported that the President 
was actively listening to the councils and taking industry 
advice into consideration when formulating policy 
(Kelly 2017b). The diminished rhetoric threatening to 
nullify NAFTA can be attributed to these corporate 
interests (Kelly 2017a). However, as Hopkins (2007) 
points out, the US experienced increasing stress between 
the discourse of nationalist conservatism and assertive 
corporate globalism, with an economy that has expanded 
globally and a politics that remains decidedly local. The 
“fear of foreign invaders, stirred up in the aftermath 
of 9/11, called for the rebuilding of fortress America” 
(Hopkins 2007, 109). This is the conflict within the 
Trump strategy: at one end an economic need of global 
integration and, at another, the local fear of losing a 
moral and cultural identity.
 Despite their initial influence in shaping 
renegotiation objectives, the access afforded to members 
of the advisory councils was eventually eliminated. The 
decision to disband the councils was precipitated by 
a majority of the councils’ members deciding to step 
down after inflammatory remarks were made by the 
President about the Charlottesville ‘Unite the Right’ 
protest, in which Trump “appeared to confer legitimacy 
on white supremacists” (Olorunnipa, McCormick, 
and Niquette 2017).3 As the NAFTA negotiations 
began just days after these events, an increasing shift 
was apparent within the Administration, and it began 
to talk about ending the agreement between the US, 
Canada and Mexico.4 Lighthizer’s opening remarks at 
the first round of negotiations in Washington indicated 
that the more moderate tone in strategic objectives 
had been abandoned: “[w]e believe that Nafta [sic] has 
fundamentally failed many Americans and needs major 
improvements” (quoted in Mauldin and Vieira 2017). 
The increase in protectionist nationalism within the 
White House created a chaotic point of uncertainty. 
Trump repeatedly threatened to initiate the NAFTA 
withdrawal mechanism through an executive order. 
The Trump Administration moved farther from the 
goal of modernizing the agreement, favored by the 
business interests of the advisory councils, toward 
populist propositions that were clearly unacceptable 
to others at the negotiating table (Swanson 2017a). 
This was especially evident in the novel suggestion by 
Lighthizer that the renewed agreement should include a 
US-specific content provision for manufactured goods 
4 Whether the disbandment of the advisory councils was by order 
from the President or by way of a consensus within the council is an 
issue unrelated to the one discussed here; the distinction between 
the two possibilities does not address the rationale behind the 
action (Tracer, Williams, and Son 2017). To contend that Trump 
had orchestrated the councils’ dissolution would be to confirm 
a continuation of his populist rhetoric, while alleging that the 
councils disbanded on their own accord would imply that the extent 
of the damage caused by the President’s previous populist rhetoric 
was enough to dissuade collaboration with more moderate business 
interests.
3 It is unclear whether opposition to the President’s remarks about 
the Charlottesville protests, and the resignations that followed, 
represent a moral issue or merely a cost-benefit analysis among 
businesses anxious to distance themselves from the White House.
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rather than the current one that applied to regional 
content in general (Donnan, Nicolaou, and Webber 
2017). Not only was this new negotiating position 
a misrepresentation of the stated goals within the 
Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation 
(USTR 2017), it rejected the once-influential advisory 
councils’ view that such a qualification “would greatly 
complicate the ability of companies, particularly small- 
and medium-size enterprises, to take advantage of the 
benefits of Nafta [sic]” (Matt Blunt quoted in Wall Street 
Journal 2017). Now following nationalist objectives, the 
President increased threats to withdraw if demands were 
not agreed to by Canadian and Mexican counterparts 
(Swanson 2017b).
 In the face of an increasingly nationalistic policy 
standpoint, the moderating influence of the advisory 
councils was eliminated and the White House returned 
to the principles on which Trump began his electoral 
campaign. For him, trade was decidedly a zero-sum game 
and disagreement among partners was cause enough 
for an abandonment of alliances.5 This shift away from 
the influence of business interests resonated in other 
spheres. For example, Trump arrested plans to establish 
economic councils on infrastructure (Beech and Burns 
2017). The new protectionist approach focused only 
on US production and reflected the limited effects of 
business influence after the disbanding of the councils. 
This seems to support a theory of opportunity in policy-
5 The implications of a NAFTA abandonment have been the subject 
of increasing study and have been an area of analysis by various 
firms and scholars. Influential reports include Cheney et al. (2017), 
Gertz (2017), Globerman and Sands (2017), Johnson (2017), 
Mosquet, Handschuh, and Wilson (2017), Murphy (2017), Parilla 
and Muro (2017), and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (2017).
making and influence: corporate influences could have 
an impact on American foreign policy only insofar 
as they have immediate access to the White House. 
Business influence can be more strongly expressed when 
institutions exist to support its advisory capacity. This 
fits within Dahl’s (1998) plurality framework, which 
sees these interests as part of a plurality that influences 
policy through government access structures. When 
these avenues of access break down, pluralism also 
dwindles. While historically influential on government 
policy, business interests have recently become limited 
in their access to the Executive after the disbanding of 
the advisory councils and thus have suffered diminishing 
input in foreign economic policy (Pastor 1980, 45). This 
diminished capacity to influence on the part of corporate 
interest groups has resulted in a more radical nationalist 
position taken by the Trump Administration toward the 
renegotiation of the trade agreement.
 This shift constitutes an exceptional circumstance 
in American politics and the President’s populist 
foundation for these actions is clear. The creation of 
the Strategic and Policy Forum and the Manufacturing 
Jobs Initiative was an ideological expression of free-
market liberalism, one generally embraced by the 
Republican Party. But their destruction was the product 
of radical populist nationalism. The electoral campaign 
and subsequent presidency of Donald Trump took its 
direction from a tradition of “Americans who have a 
natural tendency… to take up positions of fear, hostility, 
militancy, intransigence, and self-righteousness: in other 
words nationalist positions” (Lieven 2012, 83). The 
removal of business influence after Trump’s apparent 
sympathizing with white supremacists exacerbated the 
populist rhetoric of the White House, which now has 
few moderating influences on its policy development. 
The belligerent isolationism taken up by the 
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Administration’s NAFTA negotiating team, which has 
employed a strategy of repeatedly threatening to end the 
Agreement, is the expression of a nationalist populism 
free from the influence of economic elites.6 The formal 
power structures within the Executive once contained a 
regulated agonism between populist nationalism and the 
interests of corporate elites; what Mouffe (2000) would 
call the democratic paradox. But Trump’s demonization 
of Washington elites has nullified that possibility. 
Trump’s rise to power deployed the distinction between 
an ‘us’ and ‘them’ struggling for hegemonic control; in 
this case, a ‘people’s’ antagonism fighting for control 
against a liberal globalist conspiracy. The nature of his 
rise to power, therefore, made the continued existence 
of an institutional agonism impossible (Žižek 2009, 
277-81). The rhetoric the President employed, the 
disbanding of the advisory councils, and the resulting 
shift in renegotiation strategy have each been in line 
with the populist hegemonic struggle for which Trump 
was elected. A white, middle-class, nativist fear of 
cultural loss, dispossession, or alien occupation has led 
to the conspiratorial idea of a liberal dictatorship and 
a hatred for its embodiment in economic elites as well 
as ethnic and religious minorities (Lieven 2012, 85). 
While the abandonment of the advisory councils may 
have been a sign of return to original principles for some 
of Trump’s radical nationalist supporters, it has severely 
damaged the capacity of the NAFTA renegotiations 
to obtain originally stated objectives, or real economic 
6 Mearsheirmer and Walt (2007) exemplify this inequality of 
influence in the case study The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. 
Moreover, Lindblom (1977) demonstrates the effect of wealth on 
the degree of interest group influence on democratic government in 
politics and markets.
advancement in the United States.
Abandoning NAFTA would be incredibly 
damaging to the US economy, though analysts differ 
as to the immediacy of the impact and the degree 
to which corporations in various sectors would be 
affected by this scenario. It is clear, however, that the 
foreign policy strategy of the Trump Administration, 
left unmoderated by critical influences, is harmful 
for American national interests internationally. The 
official policy of the Administration is demonstrably 
lacking in substance on key international issues, with no 
mention of alliances or global challenges save its aim to 
destroy “ISIS and other radical Islamic terror groups” 
(White House 2017a). Within the Trump policy frame, 
economic logic is abandoned for nationalist rhetoric. 
Although the withdrawal from NAFTA is explicitly 
offered as a solution within the America First Foreign 
Policy (White House 2017a), it is seen in the frame of 
benefitting manufacturers and American jobs which are 
predominantly the beneficiaries of NAFTA and would 
be likely much worse off within a nationalist economic 
policy (Irwin 2017). The America First Foreign Policy 
strategy in general, and the NAFTA renegotiations 
in particular, have been negligent on the realities of 
American interests and have simplified economic 
problems to the point of illogical conclusions. Rather 
than isolation from the international economy, job 
growth in the US depends on stimulated domestic 
demand and improving competitiveness in business. 
While redressing ongoing trade disputes should be a 
US foreign-policy objective, sacrificing international 
relations with key allies by using belligerent rhetoric 
and policy positions does nothing to improve economic 
conditions and instead exemplifies a contempt for 
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the American liberal-democratic principles that have 
historically increased economic prosperity (Leffler 2017).
US foreign policy has traditionally accepted 
a balanced approach to decision-making with an 
acknowledged role in it for economic interests. This 
has been undermined severely during the presidency 
of Donald Trump. While it is clear that corporate 
interests can exert significant influence on White 
House policy, pluralism within the Executive can exist 
only insofar as competing interests are given access to 
decision-makers. The logic of this influence rests in the 
benefits of democratic agonism within policymaking. 
Given the Trump Administration’s goals of economic 
advancement, these corporate interests represented a 
source of business expertise, stakeholder consultation, 
and moderation within the White House policymaking 
mechanism. However, the populist antagonism displayed 
by President Trump has eliminated the possibility of 
moderation and endangered the renegotiation of the 
trade agreement. In the absence of corporate influence 
on the negotiations, a belligerent nationalist strategy has 
developed in the US Administration that has exacerbated 
the inherent difficulties of renegotiating NAFTA. The 
policy shift made by the Trump Administration is 
damaging not only to international relations but also 
to national economic growth. There appears to be a 
significant sacrifice of national interest for populist tenets 
and it remains to be seen what further repercussions 
this populist shift will have on both domestic and 
international policy formation.
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fourth-year student at the University of Ottawa pursuing 
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ministration. He is also a Killam Fellowship alumnus who 
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versity. Sanford is currently working for the Government 
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In America’s Age of Trump, we must all consider 
the long history of white nationalism. The 2016 
presidential election paved the way for a resurgence 
and more public appearance of this type of bigotry. 
Often falling under the general use of the “Alt-Right,” 
white nationalism became associated with Donald 
Trump and his presidency through multiple avenues 
and occasions. David Duke, a former Grand Wizard of 
the Ku Klux Klan, endorsed Trump for president and, 
later, his actions while in office, forcing the American 
public to question Trump’s stance on racism and 
white nationalism. Trump’s reluctance to denounce 
immediately Duke’s support fired up the Alt-Right 
base, while simultaneously inciting anger from many 
Americans.1 The tipping point for most Americans 
occurred with the Unite the Right rally, where both 
white supremacists and white nationalists gathered in 
Charlottesville, Virginia on August 11 and 12, 2017, 
to protest the removal of a statue of Robert E. Lee. 
The Klan Issue: 
How French Canadians 
Combatted Nativism 
through 1920 Maine Local 
Politics
ERIN BEST
Counter-protesters met the white nationalists, then 
violence erupted and multiple injuries occurred. The 
clash resulted in one woman’s death.2 On the day of the 
rally, Trump did not condemn the white nationalists or 
supremacist groups. Instead, he waited two days and 
blamed both sides for the violence that had occurred.3 
The Alt-Right did not take Trump’s comments seriously, 
as the New York Times shows in their article, “Trump 
Condemns Racists but Creates Fresh Uproar.”4 The 
President’s ability to allow white nationalists to feel 
comfortable and powerful in politics and society mirrors 
a time in the United States’ history when organizations 
such as the Ku Klux Klan felt that same level of comfort.
The 1920s offer a unique opportunity for 
historians to explore the sources and influences of 
organized race hatred. The 1920s represent a peak in 
nativist rhetoric and policy in the United States and the 
Ku Klux Klan reemerged as a key influencing factor in 
this resurgence of hate. Unlike the Klan that held power 
during the Reconstruction Era, the “New Klan” targeted 
more than just African Americans; it also targeted 
immigrants and Catholics, and anyone who did not 
reflect what the Klan defined as “100 percent American,” 
which it narrowly defined as Anglo-Saxon and 
Protestant. While the core of the Klan’s base remained 
in the Old South, it also gathered a large presence in the 
Midwest and parts of the Southwest, in states such as 
1 Peter Baker, “A President Who Fans, Rather Than Douses, the 
Nation’s Racial Fires; White House Memo,” The New York Times, 
January 12, 2018. 
2 Joe Heim, “Recounting a Day of Rage, Hate, Violence, and 
Death,” The Washington Post, August 14, 2017.
3 Michael Shear and Maggie Haberman, “Trump Defends Initial 
Remarks on Charlottesville; Again Blames ‘Both Sides’,” The New 
York Times, August 15, 2017.
4 Glenn Thrush, “Trump Condemns Racists but Creates Fresh 
Uproar,” New York Times, August 15, 2017.
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Indiana and Oklahoma.5 The Klan also drifted north and 
attempted to assert itself in New England politics during 
the 1920s. In New England, its members publicly 
opposed Irish Americans and Franco-Americans because 
of their religious identities as Catholics.6 Specifically, in 
Maine, the 1924 gubernatorial election brought the issue 
to the front stage, particularly on matters of legislation 
and denouncing the Klan. Within the context of local 
politics, the Ku Klux Klan in Maine emerged as a largely 
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant movement that sought to limit 
the culture and lives of Franco-Americans, but the ability 
of Franco-Americans to resist the attacks shows the 
power of collective and mobilized opposition to hatred.
The 1920s symbolize the height of nativism in 
the United States. After World War I, the United States 
took on an isolationist agenda and sought to limit the 
influx of immigrants into the country. Native-born 
Americans, filled with racist ideologies, feared that 
radical ideas, such as socialism and anarchism, would 
enter the country via immigration. Nativism in the 
1920s occupied only a minority of native-born American 
ideology, but it effectively contributed to legislative 
change. The 1924 quota system was a major legislative 
victory for the nativist movement. An extension of the 
1922 temporary war-time bill, the law set a cap on the 
total number of immigrants entering the United States, 
and specifically targeted  “undesirable” immigrants from 
southern and eastern Europe. The quota system utilized 
percentages, based on the 1890 census, mainly because 
that census utilized fewer ethnic categories, which 
limited the number of immigrants entering the country. 
In 1890, a majority of immigrants entering the United 
States came from northern and western Europe, while 
a smaller number entered from eastern and southern 
Europe. By using the 1890 “standard,” the United States 
could encourage more immigration from the regions 
they preferred. Immigration historians often note that 
the quota system did not set a cap on North American 
immigrants entering the country, but recognize that 
this did not stop discrimination towards Canadians 
or Mexicans.7  Yet, French Canadians still faced 
discrimination when they migrated south. In Maine, the 
Klan opposed Franco-Americans because they did not 
represent its Anglo-Saxon, Protestant ideals. 
Starting in the mid-nineteenth century, hundreds 
of thousands of French Canadians migrated south to the 
United States, more specifically to New England. They 
emigrated out of Quebec due to lack of employment 
opportunities, poor wages, and the crushing burden of 
debt. Most French Canadians intended only to move 
south temporarily. New England offered opportunities 
for economic success, but when a recession hit the 
American economy, these immigrants faced challenges 
when attempting to return home.8 French Canadians 
often came from rural areas, but the industrialization 
of New England mills allowed them to enter the paid 
5 Rory McVeigh, The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan: Right-Wing 
Movements and National Politics, 26.
6 Mark Paul Richard, “This Is Not a Catholic Nation’: The Ku Klux 
Klan Confronts Franco-Americans in Maine,” The New England 
Quarterly 82, no. 2 (2009) 287.
7 Mae M. Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American 
Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 
1924,” The Journal of American History 86, no. 1 (1999) 70.
8 Yves Roby, The Franco-Americans of New England: Dreams and 
Realities (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 19.
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workforce easily, as mills sought low-skilled employees. 
By the twentieth century, unable to return home due 
to lack of finances, French Canadians settled all around 
New England, with a high concentration of them in 
Maine. Franco-Americans found success in the textile 
industry and often sent their children to parochial 
schools where they learned and practiced Catholicism, 
which caused resentment among native-born Americans. 
Throughout the 1920s, the Klan in Maine publicly 
opposed Franco-Americans for their religious practices, 
seeking to limit their culture and lifestyle through 
legislation.
The 1924 gubernatorial election in Maine 
showed the clear divide between supporters of the Ku 
Klux Klan and those opposed to it. The Klan became 
a powerful faction of the Republican Party in Maine 
because of the party’s unwillingness to comment on the 
Klan. While Maine’s election seemed to focus largely 
on the denunciation of the Klan, the national discourse 
was different. William Pattangall, the Democratic 
nominee for the governorship of Maine, wanted the 
national Democratic Party to oppose the Ku Klux Klan 
collectively and publically to the same degree that he 
did. The Republican nominee, Ralph Brewster, did 
not publicly oppose or denounce the Klan. The 1924 
New York Times article, “How Klan Figures in Maine 
Election” gives insight on the different goals and values 
that the nominees held, while attempting to determine 
how the Klan’s power in Maine grew. The anonymous 
journalist wrote, “The plan failed, for the convention, 
despite Mr. Pattangall’s advocacy of an anti-Klan 
platform declaration, refused to adopt it… The Maine 
delegates returned home… without the endorsement of 
their party.”9 If Pattangall had successfully secured his 
party’s opposition to the Klan, it would have diluted the 
Klan’s power not just in Maine, but across the whole 
nation. The national Democratic Party’s unwillingness 
to oppose the Klan officially shows the lack of unity 
with the national party because of the Klan’s appeal to 
Southern Democrats, while it also shows the support 
that the Klan gained on a national level. Pattangall based 
his campaign on an anti-Klan rhetoric, but he failed 
to secure the governorship with this alone.  The Klan 
avoided being opposed outright by Democrats, which 
allowed it to gain more power through Republican Party 
and local government positions.
The 1924 gubernatorial election in Maine 
showed the true influence of the Klan in local politics. 
Many Maine residents aligned themselves with the 
Klan’s interests during the gubernatorial election because 
they represented an opposition to Irish Americans 
and Franco-Americans. These residents felt that these 
hyphenated Americans threatened the already struggling 
Maine economy.  Unlike in the South, where the Klan 
largely allied itself with Democrats, the Klan in New 
England often backed Republican candidates, and the 
gubernatorial election in Maine did not differ from 
7 Mae M. Ngai, “The Architecture of Race in American 
Immigration Law: A Reexamination of the Immigration Act of 
1924,” The Journal of American History 86, no. 1 (1999) 70.
8 Yves Roby, The Franco-Americans of New England: Dreams and 
Realities (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), 19.
9 “How Klan Figures in Maine Election,” New York Times, August 
31, 1924.
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this regional characteristic. Prior to the election, the 
Republican Party had dominated Maine public offices, 
which reduced the necessity of the Klan’s support in 
obtaining votes. Some sociologists have noted that the 
Klan thrived in areas where it emerged as a solution to 
local problems, while also being a moral support for 
the dominant demographic. In the case of Maine, the 
dominant demographic tended to be white, native-
born, and Republican and this is where the Klan found 
refuge.10 Even within this safe haven, the Klan’s mere 
presence in the state forced many people to reconsider 
their political allegiances, including Franco-Americans. 
The 1924 New York Times article “How Klan Figures in 
Maine Election” reported that “Heretofore the French-
Canadians in those counties of this State in which they 
are most numerous have generally voted the Republican 
ticket, but on the anti-Klan issue raised by Mr. 
Pattangall they may not do so this year.”11 The Franco-
Americans in Maine realigned their political affiliation 
to the Democratic Party based on local Democratic 
opposition to the Klan’s rhetoric. Although the national 
Democratic Party did not support William Pattangall’s 
opposition to the Klan, his position in Maine allowed 
Franco-Americans to realign themselves accordingly. 
While on a national level this shift did not make much 
of an impact, Franco-Americans’ political adjustment 
shows one way they attempted to defend themselves 
from discrimination. This political realignment was 
manifested when politicians began debate over an 
amendment to the Maine constitution to prohibit public 
funds from being used in parochial schools.
Franco-American families often sent their 
children to parochial schools to foster their culture, 
language, and religion, but this only encouraged 
opposition from the Klan. During the early twentieth 
century, Franco-Americans felt conflict when deciding 
whether to send their children to public schools or to 
parochial schools. Public schools promised to assimilate 
immigrant children more easily into American society, 
but parochial schools allowed for these children to 
keep their French language and their own culture 
alive. In 1919, the Maine legislature passed a law that 
prohibited the use of the French language in public 
schools, which Franco-Americans deemed an attack on 
their identity. This law also made parochial schools a 
more appealing option. To draw more Franco-American 
families to the parochial schools, some Catholic parishes 
stopped charging tuition and instead covered school 
costs through donations and by reorganizing their 
finances to allow for more money to be used in their 
schools. When this failed, parochial schools pushed on, 
but politicians attempted to pass legislation limiting 
their ability and influence throughout the 1910s and 
1920s. Republican politicians and the Klan argued that 
teaching foreign languages in parochial schools did 
not promote an American national identity. Proposed 
legislation appeared in all parts of New England. These 
laws ranged in their aims, from completely eliminating 
private schools to limiting the amount of time a foreign 
language could be taught in a parochial school. In 
Yves Roby’s 2004 book, The Franco-Americans of New 
England: Dreams and Realities, he argues “That was why 
the elite sought, by their own exemplary conduct, to 
convince their fellow-citizens that the attachment to the 
French language or to the Catholic religion in no way 
10 See, for example, McVeigh, The Rise of the Ku Klux Klan, 199.
11 “How Klan Figures in Maine Election,” New York Times, August 
31, 1924.
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altered their devotion to the American Republic.”12 The 
Ku Klux Klan believed that the unwillingness of Franco-
Americans to relinquish their French language came 
from misplaced allegiances to the Catholic Church, but 
in reality, their grip on their first language had more to 
do with retaining their heritage. The debate on whether 
public funds should be used in parochial schools became 
an important matter in Maine’s 1924 gubernatorial 
election.
The Klan opposed the parochial schools because 
it felt that they prevented immigrants from assimilating 
into American society and because of their Catholic 
affiliations. During the 1920s, the Klan wanted to 
promote Protestantism and “Americanism” at the 
expense of Catholics. The 1924 election focused on 
an amendment that would prohibit the use of public 
funds in parochial schools. The influx of Catholic 
immigrants to the United States caused many native-
born Americans to fear the allegiances they brought and 
their unwillingness to assimilate. The Klan became very 
outspoken against parochial schools and argued that not 
forcing Catholic immigrants to assimilate into American 
society threatened the safety of the United States. Klan 
members believed that immigrants’ traditions, religions, 
and feelings of loyalty to their home countries could 
not be compatible with life in the United States.13 
Eugene Farnsworth, an organizer for the Klan, became 
an outspoken champion of Protestantism and promoted 
a “100 Percent American” national identity. In the 
Lewiston Daily Sun’s 1923 article “Names of Local 
Klan Agents Disclosed at Meeting in Auburn,” the 
paper quotes Farnsworth promoting Klan attitudes. 
Farnsworth reportedly stated, “If they are teaching 
Americanism in Parochial schools they are false to Rome. 
If they don’t they are false to America.”14 In other words, 
Farnsworth claimed that a person could not be both a 
Catholic and an American because one would cancel 
out the other. He believed that Catholics would always 
answer to the Pope before they would answer to the 
United States government and based on that premise, he 
believed Catholicism should not be supported directly 
or indirectly by public funds in the United States. 
Contrary to what the Klan believed, Franco-Americans 
saw themselves as ideal immigrants, by moving to the 
United States, by working in the industrial sector, and 
by learning English. Franco-Americans believed these 
principles contributed to the foundation of the United 
States. How the Franco-Americans in Maine responded 
to the Klan represents their ability to be their own agents 
during a time when they faced discrimination.
While the rise of the Klan seemed imminent, the 
mobilization of Franco-Americans and the difficulties 
the Klan faced in the mid-1920s tells a different story. 
In Maine, the Klan faced both internal divisions and 
financial problems. Klan organizations in cities such 
as Auburn and Lewiston, which had high Catholic 
populations, faced internal divisions, which resulted in 
the formation of rival factions. Furthermore, the arrival 
of Edward Gayer, the new King Kleagle in Maine, 
12 Roby, Franco-Americans of New England, 240.
13Thomas Pegram, One Hundred Percent American: The Rebirth and 
Decline of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920s (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 
2011), 48.
14 “Names of Local Klan Agents Disclosed at Meeting in Auburn,” 
The Lewiston Daily Sun, April 19, 1923.
15 Mark Paul Richard, Not a Catholic Nation: The Ku Klux Klan 
Confronts New England in the 1920s (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2015), 50.
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prompted many Klan members to leave and follow 
their former leader, Eugene Farnsworth.15 The Klan also 
faced financial problems. The organization became the 
target of many lawsuits and a rise in unemployment 
within their membership meant fewer members paid 
their dues regularly. To add to their financial difficulties, 
at the end of 1924, a massive and expensive building 
in Portland that the Klan had funded burned down. In 
addition, The Klan had asked the city of Portland to 
waive its property tax, claiming status as a religious and 
educational organization, but the city denied it. 
While the Klan dealt with these hardships, 
Franco-Americans mobilized to defend themselves. Mark 
Richard’s book, Not a Catholic Nation, describes the 
Ku Klux Klan in New England during the 1920s and 
one section of it focuses on the Klan in Maine. Richard 
describes the awareness that Franco-Americans had 
about their rights and their ability to become naturalized 
citizens, allowing them to vote. Franco-Americans saw 
their ability to vote in elections as their strongest tool 
against the Klan. Richard describes the special election 
held in Maine in 1926, after the death of a senator. The 
Klan did not support the Republican Party’s nominee, 
Arthur Gould. As a response, both Ralph Brewster, 
the governor, and the Klan put their support behind 
the Democratic nominee, Fulton Redman. Franco-
Americans, who formerly crossed party lines in the 
1924 gubernatorial election, voting for the Democratic 
nominee, used their voice to vote en masse for the 
Republican nominee, in order to oppose the candidate 
backed by the Klan.16 Gould’s overwhelming victory over 
the Klan-backed nominee shows how Franco-Americans 
acted as their own force to combat the discrimination 
they faced. Although Franco-Americans may not 
have been the deciding vote, their ability to oppose 
collectively one nominee shows their desire to create a 
change in their government. While the Klan seemed to 
be an overwhelming force in Maine, the mobilization of 
Franco-Americans against the Klan and Klan-supported 
political figures shows the power that this minority 
faction could wield.
The Ku Klux Klan emerged in Maine as a 
group opposing Franco-Americans for their Catholic 
identities, but the ability of Franco-Americans to act 
as their own agents and protest the discrimination 
shows their ability to overpower a vocal, hate-focused 
minority. The Klan sought to limit the culture and 
use of the French language by Franco-Americans on a 
local level through state legislation. The Klan backed 
politicians in the state who had the ability to pass the 
type of legislation they wanted, such as the amendment 
prohibiting public funds from being used in parochial 
schools. While the Klan seemed to hold power over local 
politics, Franco-Americans mobilized their numbers and 
educated themselves on how to combat this opposition. 
Franco-Americans in Maine became naturalized citizens, 
enabling them to act and vote for the politicians who 
best represented them. Often, in the 1920s, that meant 
the politician not supported by the Klan. Their ability to 
mobilize and vote to help enable change in local politics 
can be used as an example today. In the divided Age 
of Trump, where the Alt-Right and white nationalist 
groups feel comfortable enough to publicly display their 
own bigotry in mainstream politics, Franco-American 
resistance to the power of hate through their political 
action can be used as proof of the power of popular 
politics to mitigate the power of hate in current politics.
16 Richard, Not a Catholic Nation, 52.
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Liquefied Natural Gas in 
North America: An Analysis 
of the United States’ 
Exportation Position in 
the Context of its North 
American Free Trade 
Agreement Partners
SEAN CUNNINGHAM
Liquefied natural gas is quickly emerging as a dominant player in the global energy trade. As more and more production terminals are built, the potential for its use in replacing more 
harmful fossil fuels grows. It has not only been touted 
as an important step in the stalling of global climate 
change, but also as a viable energy source for developing 
economies in Asia and Africa. Increasing production 
could effectively reduce the need for coal as an energy 
source in several regions of the world. The United States 
is at the forefront of the trade in this cryogenically stored 
fuel, but there are restrictions to the material’s economic 
prosperity. The U.S. imposes limits on those countries 
with which it can trade liquefied natural gas, and 
requires permitting and petitioning to allow countries 
that do not meet their requirements to receive LNG 
shipments. Still, the United States is in a better position 
than its counterparts to the north and south when it 
comes to the export of LNG. Its comparative advantage 
rests in high volumes of surplus, a well-established 
infrastructure and a fairly compliant regulation system. 
However, with continental, cross-border trading flows 
dictating the crux of LNG trade for the three North 
American partners, freezing each other out may result 
in severe harm to U.S. export markets. The North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has 
been in effect for more than 20 years, has come under 
fire.1 A main trade policy of the Trump Administration 
has been to renegotiate the trilateral deal so that it better 
benefits Americans. For the past several months, the 
trade ministers from Canada, the United States and 
Mexico have sat down to draft a new agreement, but the 
United States has stated it will walk away from the table 
if its demands are not met. This could spell disaster for 
the U.S., which would no longer be able to send gas to 
its primary importer, Mexico. The United States has the 
possibility to expand its market, exporting gas to Europe, 
Latin America and Southeast Asia. Unfortunately, 
American regulatory statutes stand in the way of the 
promotion of better opportunities for energy trade. The 
U.S. should look to reduce these regulations not only 
to benefit the economy, but to act as a failsafe should 
negotiations fall through.
Liquefied Natural Gas Production
 While most of the trade in natural gas occurs 
through pipeline transport, liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
is used to transport energy to and from regions that are 
not suitable for pipelines to traverse. In order to convert 
natural gas to its liquid form, it first must be extracted 
1 Editors’ note: This essay was written in early Spring 2018, months 
before the October 2018 conclusion of negotiations resulting in 
the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), the 
successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
This scholarship provides scholarly insight into the subject that was 
available at that moment.
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from the ground. This is done through a process known 
as hydraulic fracturing, or fracking.2 Gas is naturally 
found in pockets that are encased in large deposits of 
shale deep underground. To remove the gas, a well is 
drilled into the ground, and a mixture of sand, water 
and chemicals are injected into a layer of shale. The rock 
subsequently splits, releasing the gas and remaining 
fluids, which are pumped to the surface. The blend is 
then piped to a terminal, where it is purified. Carbon 
dioxide, hydrogen sulfate and mercury, among other 
impurities are removed from the product, and it is 
cooled down to approximately -260°F. When condensed, 
the gas is 1/600th the size of its original volume, allowing 
greater quantities to be moved. LNG is then piped from 
the terminal to a transport truck or vessel and shipped 
to an import terminal where it is then stored, converted 
back into its gaseous state, and distributed to consumers.
 Investments in LNG are costly and time 
consuming. It is estimated that more than 30% of the 
cost of running an LNG terminal rests in construction 
alone.3 One of the projects most recently approved, 
the Driftwood Facility in Lake Charles, Louisiana, will 
cost more than $15 billion dollars to build.4 This site 
will be able to produce more than 27 million tons of 
LNG annually and will have four individual terminals. 
It is expected that initial LNG production will begin 
in Lake Charles in 2022 and the complex will be fully 
operational by 2025. Shipments of LNG can be trucked 
across the continent, but they are more commonly 
transported in large vessels overseas. The tanker ships 
ferrying LNG are chartered five years before shipments 
commence, and they cost more than $200 million to 
build.5 Each ship is in service for approximately 35 years. 
These massive investments are not common and require 
a long-term commitment and market stability. 
 There are significant risks to the production 
of LNG. If the frozen product is leaked and comes 
into contact with water, it undergoes Rapid-Phase 
Transition.6  This creates a massive explosion as the gas 
expands. Additionally, LNG is extremely flammable.7  
There are specific protocols in place on these transport 
vessels, including those prohibiting the use of electronic 
devices past the ship’s bridge. When wielded improperly, 
LNG terminals and vessels could be commandeered for 
acts of terrorism or coercion, causing national security 
concerns. For a period following the September 11, 
2001 attacks, LNG vessels were not allowed to enter 
Boston’s Harbor for fear they would be turned into 
floating bombs.8
2 “What Is Fracking and Why Is It Controversial?,” BBC News UK 
(2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-14432401.
3 Brian Songhurst, “LNG Plant Cost Escalation,” Oxford 
Institite for Energy Studies (University of Oxford, 2014), www.
oxfordenergy.org/publications/lng-plant-cost-escalation/.
4 Joshua Mann, “Tellurian Makes $15b Deal for Engineering and 
Construction of Flagship Lng Project,”  Houston Business Journal 
(2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/news/2017/11/13/
tellurian-makes-15b-deal-for-engineering-and.html.
5 Xun Yao Chen, “A Guide to Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers and 
Key Shipping Costs,”  (2014), http://marketrealist.com/2014/05/
expensive-lng-carriers-results-in-dividends/.
6 “Rlng Spill and Rapid-Phase Transition,” KLAW LNG, https://
www.klawlng.com/lng-spill-and-rapid-phase-transition/.
7 “Consequence Assessment Methods for Incidents Involving 
Releases from Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers,”  ABSG Consulting 
Inc. (Federal Energy Regulatory Comission, 2014).
8 Sam Fletcher, “Banned in Boston, LNG Tanker Will Unload 
in Savannah,”  Oil and Gas Journal (2001), http://www.ogj.com/
articles/2001/10/banned-in-boston-lng-tanker-will-unload-in-
savannah.html.
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 The environmental benefits of LNG are also 
subject to criticism. The energy source has been found 
to burn 50-60% less carbon dioxide than coal, which 
is a significant improvement when put into wide-scale 
use.9 The methane leakage that is a byproduct of LNG 
production, however, is cause for concern. Its output, 
especially during transport, contributes to the increased 
levels of heat-trapping gases in the atmosphere. The use 
and exploitation of land that is required for fracking and 
the transport of natural gas has caused concern over loss 
of habitat, erosion, and aquatic pollution.10 The location 
of these terminals and pipelines can cut right through 
animal migratory paths, causing further confusion for 
seasonal nomads. Additionally, significant negative 
externalities arise with respect to renewable resource 
production. While these resources are a cleaner source 
of energy and therefore are more desirable in the long 
term, they are also more expensive to produce and do 
not have the same storage capacity as natural gas. Since 
the price of LNG per output is cheaper, it is often seen 
as undercutting the renewable resource market.
LNG in the United States
 The history of the trade of liquefied natural gas 
in America has not always been so lucrative. The United 
States’ first import facility was constructed in the late 
1930s.11 In 1944, there was an explosion at a terminal 
in Cleveland, when LNG leaked and then ignited. One 
hundred and thirty people were killed as a result of the 
disaster, and the construction of additional terminals in 
the country was delayed for more than a decade. The 
first export of LNG was sent to England from the Gulf 
of Mexico in 1959.12  In the 1960s, there was discovery 
of natural gas deposits in Algeria, and terminals were 
constructed there to supply an energy-starved Europe. 
During this period, the United States began to export 
small amounts of LNG to Japan. By the 1970s, the 
U.S. had constructed four import terminals in Texas 
and Massachusetts. These terminals remained largely 
unused through the 1980s and 1990s because there was 
a decline in the need for natural gas. By the 2000s, the 
LNG trade had resumed and there was a desire for rapid 
increase of import facilities. As these facilities were being 
constructed, however, enormous amounts of natural gas 
deposits were discovered beneath U.S. soil. This led to 
an about-face, as investors began pouring money into 
their facilities to convert them to export terminals and 
scrambled to build storage facilities to store the surplus 
natural gas. It took time to convert these facilities, and 
the mass exportation of LNG did not begin until 2016. 
 As of December 2016, the Energy Institute of 
America (EIA) webpage estimates that the United States 
has more than 200 trillion cubic feet of known natural 
gas resources buried in shale deposits, and more than 
600 trillion cubic feet that have yet to be proven.13 In 
9 “Cost and Performance Baseline for Fossil Energy Plants, Volume 
1: Bituminous Coal and Natural Gas to Electricity “, ed. National 
Energy Technology Laboratory (NETL) (United States Department 
of Energy, 2010).
10 “Environmental Impacts of Natural Gas,” (2017), http://www.
ucsusa.org/clean-energy/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/environmental-
impacts-of-natural-gas#references.
11 Michael L. O’Neill and Brian D. O’Neill, “U.S. LNG in the 
Global Marketplace “ ABA Infrastructure and Regulated Industries 
Section 53, no. 4 (2014).
12 Sydney Weathersby, “A Deep Dive into Liquefied Natural Gas 
(“LNG”): Is Lng a Clean Enough and Positive Energy Source for 
Globalized Trade or a Port Nuisance?,” in ValpoScholar Valparaiso 
University (Valparaiso University Law Review, 2016).
13  “Natural Gas Explained - Where Our Natural Gas Comes From,” 
U.S. Energy Information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/
energyexplained/index.cfm?page=natural_gas_where.
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2016, the United States was estimated to have used 
27.49 trillion cubic feet of natural gas domestically, two 
thirds of which was used for electricity and industrial 
sectors and 88 billion cubic feet of which had been 
imported. The United States receives LNG from chiefly 
Trinidad and Tobago, however small shipments also 
make their way into the country via Norway and some 
is piped in from Canada.14 The EIA estimates that the 
United States exported more than 180 billion cubic feet 
of LNG in 2016. Currently, the United States has only 
two operational export terminals. According to the U.S. 
Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC), the 
Cheniere/Sabine Pass terminal processes 2.1 billion cubic 
feet per day of liquefied natural gas.15  As of August 28, 
2017, there were 11 project applications pending with 
FERC.16 These projects exist primarily in the Gulf of 
Mexico and there is one planned for Alaska. The EIA 
estimates the U.S. is projected to overtake Qatar as the 
world’s second largest producer of LNG, falling just 
behind Australia by the year 2023.17
 The United States government employs several 
agencies to deal with the regulation of LNG imports 
and exports. In 2005, the Energy Policy Act expanded 
FERC to make the agency responsible for the siting, 
permitting, construction and operation of terminals.18 
The agency oversees 24 facilities, but many more are 
being proposed and in the process of being approved. 
There are state and local regulations that determine the 
existence of some terminals, however these parameters 
do not generally interfere with those of the federal 
government. Additionally, FERC is responsible for 
creating environmental assessments and impact 
statements for LNG proposals. These papers include the 
water and resource studies, effects on wildlife, as well 
as public commentary. Additionally, the Department 
of Energy employs the Office of Fossil Energy for the 
approval of any importing or exporting of natural gas.19 
As laid out in the Energy Policy Act of 1992:
the importation of the natural gas referred 
to in subsection (b), or the exportation of 
natural gas to a nation with which there is 
in effect a free trade agreement requiring 
national treatment for trade in natural gas, 
shall be deemed to be consistent with the 
public interest, and applications for such 
importation or exportation shall be granted 
without modification or delay.20  
National treatment prevents discrimination favoring 
domestic companies when foreign competitors are 
allowed in, and it allows foreign enterprises to be treated 
like domestic companies. This also means that the 
Office of Fossil Energy has the authority to unilaterally 
18 “LNG,” United States Department of Energy, https://www.ferc.
gov/industries/gas/indus-act/lng.asp.
19 O’Neill and O’Neill.
20 Energy Policy Act of 1992, 102nd, H.R. 776.
14  “Natural Gas Explained - Liquefied Natural Gas,” U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/
index.cfm?page=natural_gas_lng.
15  Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, “North American LNG 
Import/Export Terminals - Existing,” (U.S. Department of Energy, 
2017).
16  “North American LNG Export Terminals - Proposed,” (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2017).
17  Nina Chestney, “U.S. On Track to Be World’s No. 2 LNG 
Exporter by End-2022: IEA,”  Reuters (2017), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-gas-lng-iea/u-s-on-track-to-be-worlds-no-2-lng-
exporter-by-end-2022-iea-idUSKBN19Y0L1.
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block any trade of LNG that is not deemed to be in 
the public interest. It is entirely at the discretion of the 
Department of Energy to determine what does and 
does not constitute public interest. There are various 
other agencies that are required to oversee aspects of the 
industry. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency 
and the Department of Transportation are all responsible 
for more specific areas of regulation. The Coast Guard 
is responsible for protecting offshore LNG terminals 
as well as the vessels that transport the gas through 
American waters. They require specific guidelines for 
ships and facilities to follow to prevent unnecessary 
disaster.
 The expansion of LNG has been criticized by 
some groups, mainly the Industrial Energy Consumers 
of America (IECA). In August 2017, it sent a letter to 
the U.S. Secretary of Energy, Rick Perry, urging the 
government to cease all natural gas trade with countries 
that do not have a Free Trade Agreement with the 
United States. The letter claims: “The net effect is that 
LNG exports, specifically to [non-FTA] countries lowers 
our competitors’ costs and increases ours, directly and 
negatively impacting competitiveness and our ability to 
justify reshoring.”21
The letter also cites an EIA report that shows the 
approvals for exporting LNG reached 71.2% 
of the natural gas demand for the United States 
in 2016. The letter then lays out two scenarios 
in which most of the natural gas reserves in the 
country will be consumed by 2050, using these 
to justify their proposed moratorium. They 
believe that if the demand for gas grows as the 
supply diminishes, then consumer prices - both 
domestic and abroad - will continue to grow. The 
industrial sector is the second biggest consumer 
of natural gas domestically. This also plays into 
the Trump Administration’s narrative, “Buy 
American,” and its general skepticism of foreign 
trade. 
What the IECA fails to acknowledge is the potential 
for increased prices at home, should the United 
States restrict energy flows. If the United States offers 
only LNG to FTA countries, the price will initially 
decrease. But as more of those countries become 
more heavily reliant on the importation of LNG as a 
cheaper alternative to harmful coal and oil emissions, 
then demand will continue to grow and the issue of 
price hikes for domestic consumers will reemerge. 
Furthermore the U.S. is not required to grant national 
treatment to foreign firms entering the country or 
purchasing gas from nations who do not have FTA 
status. This means that America can purposely keep 
prices higher for non-FTA countries as they import to 
offset the cost to domestic firms. 
 The Trump Administration should welcome 
the increased export of LNG to FTA and non-FTA 
countries alike. The owner of a newly authorized LNG 
factory in Louisiana has been a high-profile campaign 
donor to Energy Secretary Perry as well as being his 
former employer.22 Ties like these to large petroleum 
companies could hasten the authorization of LNG 
21 Cicio, Paul N. “Letter to Energy Secretary Rick Perry.” 16 August 
2017.
22  Luke Bassett, “Rick Perry’s Dirty Industry Donors and 
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permits. Secretary of Commerce, Wilbur Ross, brokered 
a deal with the Chinese that will lead to larger amounts 
of LNG being exported from the United States and this 
is essential.23 Unfortunately, as the supply of natural 
gas has becomes greater, there is a lack of motivation 
to build new terminals. The capital has dried up 
because the price of the good is going down yet the 
costs of building facilities are also decreasing. If the 
U.S. can complete this deal, it is likely that an influx of 
investment from the Chinese will emerge as they look 
to meet their growing demand for energy. The former 
head of the Office of Fossil Energy, Christopher Smith 
refuted the idea that the Administration can accrue 
such an investment, claiming that it will have to be the 
private sector, not the government that will need to be 
responsible for luring in investors. Additionally, Trump 
has been heard touting the return of the coal and nuclear 
power industries. This has caused some LNG companies 
to feel excluded. As the CEO of Canary LLC, Dan 
Eberhart, put it in an E&E News article, “Honestly, I 
think it’s very narrow for them to be so focused on coal. 
Either energy - or political-wise, it doesn’t make a lot 
of sense to me. Not all of these policies seem to work 
in concert together. [Trump’s] trade policies step on 
American energy dominance.”24
 Other advocates of LNG expansion include the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce. It argues that restrictions 
on the export of LNG to non-FTA countries are in 
direct violation of existing trade agreements.25 Under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
special discretion is given to countries that restrict 
their exports of natural resources for fear of depleting 
their supply, however because of the consistent supply 
of LNG being exported to countries with which the 
United States engages in free trade, the exemption is no 
longer valid. The GATT requires that all non-military 
goods be freely exported to member countries. There is a 
similar stipulation from the World Trade Organization. 
There are a series of successful WTO cases that have 
been levied against China over its restrictions on similar 
materials, some of which include the United States as 
a complainant. Additionally, during the past several 
sessions of Congress, senators have put forth bills that 
seek to expand the market for LNG. Previous bills have 
received bipartisan support and were aimed primarily 
at allowing exports to Japan and NATO allies without 
modifications or delayed approval; but none were passed. 
Most recently, Senators Bill Cassidy (R-LA) and Marco 
Rubio (R-FL) introduced a bill that would allow the 
transactions of small shipments of LNG to all countries 
immediately upon receipt of application.26 Both Florida 
and Louisiana would stand to see substantial gains from 
the increased export of natural gas.
23 Peter Behr and Jenny Mandel, “LNG a Test Case for Trump’s 
Energy ‘Dominance’,”  Energywire (2017), https://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060056968.
24 Zack Coleman, “‘America First’ or coal first? LNG groups want 
to know,” E&E News. 4 September 2018. https://www.eenews.net/
stories/1060095637.
25 Brian Scheid to Platts Inside Energy, 2017, https://www.
globalenergyinstitute.org/could-any-limits-us-export-lng-violate-law.
26 Timothy Cama, “Senate Bill Would Fast-Track ‘Small-Scale’ 
Natural Gas Exports,” The Hill (2017), http://thehill.com/policy/
energy-environment/356033-senate-bill-would-fast-track-small-
scale-natural-gas-exports.
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Canadian LNG
In recent years, there have been a number of LNG 
projects proposed in Canada, and significant 
investments have been made in their planning and 
approval. Despite this, Canada has yet to emerge as 
an active participant in the increasingly competitive 
global LNG market, but proponents are still actively 
working on projects on both coasts. 
– Shelly Milutinovic, Chief 
Economist, National Energy Board27
The trade in liquefied natural gas in Canada is stagnant 
at best. Canada has a significant surplus of the energy 
source, but its traditional export partner, the United 
States, is replacing its imports with domestic production. 
Canada has more than one trillion cubic feet of natural 
gas in shale deposits in British Columbia and Alberta 
alone.28 Currently, only one LNG plant is in operation, 
an import terminal located in New Brunswick.29 
This terminal, Canaport LNG, is responsible for the 
production of more than 1 billion cubic feet of gas per 
day.30 As of September 2017, 23 LNG terminal projects 
with export licenses had been proposed, with exporting 
permits lasting anywhere from 20 to 40 years. Few have 
broken ground.31
 The Canadian Government’s National Energy 
Board is responsible for the review of applications 
for export permits. No countries are institutionally 
restricted from receiving LNG imports. The permits 
exist primarily to track the amount of LNG leaving the 
country, and to monitor the domestic supply to make 
sure there is enough to sustain Canada’s energy needs. 
Additionally, jurisdictions vary for pipelines. Pipelines 
that run solely within a province are regulated by that 
provincial government, whereas interprovincial pipelines 
are regulated by the Federal government. Both the 
Federal and provincial governments are required to do 
environmental assessments on proposed projects. The 
overlap of the two competing spheres of government 
can discourage investment and draw out the application 
process. Given that constructing a terminal is time 
consuming, administrative delays can destroy working 
deals. 
 In July 2017, British Columbia lost a $36 billion 
deal with the Malaysian energy company, Petronas, 
with the government citing global economic issues.32 
In actuality, a series of governmental blunders sank 
the otherwise lucrative deal. The previous provincial 
government had sluggishly negotiated with Petronas, due 
to a bevy of lawsuits by activists. When the provincial 
election of summer 2017, soon-to-be Premier John 
Horgan had campaigned fiercely against the deal. 
27 “Canada a ‘Late Entrant’ to Global Liquefied Natural Gas 
Market, Says New Neb Report,” Government of Canada, https://
www.canada.ca/en/national-energy-board/news/2017/07/canada_a_
late_entranttogloballiquefiednaturalgasmarketsaysnewneb.html.
28 “Canada’s Role in the Global LNG Market – Energy Market 
Assessment,” Government of Canada, http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/
nrg/sttstc/ntrlgs/rprt/2017lngmrkt/cndslnglndscp-eng.html.
29 Commission, “North American LNG Import/Export Terminals - 
Existing.”
30 “About Canaport Lng,” Canaport LNG, http://www.canaportlng.
com/About+Canaport+LNG.
31 “Canadian LNG Projects,” Government of Canada, http://www.
nrcan.gc.ca/energy/natural-gas/5683.
32 Caludia Cattaneo, “‘A Tragedy for Canada’: Petronas Cancels 
$36b Lng Project as B.C. Jacks up Demands,” Financial Post, 26 
July 2017.
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If elected, he promised to negotiate new terms, and 
potentially move the site of the project. Horgan’s 
government then increased its demands in a new 
negotiation process. It wanted additional compensation 
for the resources being taken from the land, as well 
as increased incentives for affected First Nations. The 
stipulations caused Petronas to walk away from the 
negotiating table. This  was not the only proposal 
that was canceled. There are six deals that have fallen 
through, each of which is listed on the government’s 
website.33 Complex regulatory frameworks severely 
reduce the ability of Canadians to install LNG terminals 
for exportation, which reduces their overall competitive 
advantage. 
LNG in Mexico
 The energy infrastructure of Mexico is 
crumbling. Its inefficiencies have led to production 
decline across several industries within the energy 
sector.34 Reforms have been slow and ineffective, 
causing the government to open the country to foreign 
companies, changing decades of precedent.
 In 2013, the Mexican government amended 
its constitution so that private investment could take 
place in energy. The state-owned oil company, Petróleos 
Mexicanos (PEMEX), along with the Comisión 
Federal de Electricidad (CFE), the state-owned electric 
company, would no longer have a monopoly on energy 
in Mexico.35 Conditions immediately following the 
reforms did not incentivize investment and low prices 
made foreign companies’ importations unprofitable. 
There were internal tensions between PEMEX and 
CFE, which led to concerns over fair competition and 
stability within the region. Then, there was an uptick in 
investment, particularly from American companies, as 
surpluses of U.S. natural gas began to flow into Mexico 
rapidly. Mexico currently has three import terminals, 
receiving approximately 2.2 billion cubic feet of natural 
gas per day.36 Between February 2016 and March 2017, 
90 shipments of LNG were exported by the United 
States, 18 of which were sent to Mexico.37 This makes at 
least 55% of Mexico’s energy supply dependent on the 
importation of U.S. energy. 
 There are concerns looking ahead to the Mexican 
presidential election in 2018. Frontrunner, Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador, has been a staunch supporter 
of rolling back the energy reforms that have taken place 
in recent years.38 This has been particularly worrisome 
to investors, who need certainty to partake in such lofty 
and time-sensitive investments. Existing investment 
commitments are also on the rise, with the Mexican 
Energy Secretary citing $49 billion committed to drilling 
and exploration since 2015, a majority of which is 
33 “Canadian LNG Projects.”
34 Adrian Duhalt, “Nafta Negotiations: What’s in It for the U.S.-
Mexico Energy Trade?,”  Forbes (2017), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/thebakersinstitute/2017/11/17/nafta-negotiations-whats-in-it-
for-the-u-s-mexico-energy-trade/#192ac7993b24.
35 Havilands Sheldahl-Thomason and Richard H.K. Vietor, 
“Mexico’s Energy Reform,” Harvard Business School  (2017).
36  Commission, “North American LNG Import/Export Terminals - 
Existing.”
37  Jude Clemente, “Mexico Is Also Importing U.S. Liquefied 
Natural Gas,”  Forbes (2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
judeclemente/2017/04/05/mexico-is-also-importing-u-s-liquefied-
natural-gas/#743c8bf4e292.
38  Nacha Cattan and Eric Martin, “Mexico Front-Runner Signals 
Plans to Maintain Parts of Economic Policy,”  Bloomberg Politics 
(2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-21/
mexico-s-amlo-signals-plans-to-maintain-parts-of-economic-policy.
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American.39 ExxonMobil is committing $300 million to 
distribution to Mexico over the next 10 years. Obrador 
has softened his stance, but is still calling for an increase 
in the development of domestic energy production. 
He wants to focus on reviving gasoline refineries to 
reduce the dependence on U.S. imports, but this may 
be problematic as they are all more than 35 years old 
and not profitable. Should Obrador win the election, 
there will be a considerable reevaluation of the contracts 
signed under previous president Enrique Peña Nieto to 
determine if they are in the “best interest of Mexico,” 
which creates caution among investors in the region.40
A NAFTA Withdrawal
 President Trump has indicated that the United 
States could withdraw from NAFTA should the 
negotiation process fail to secure significant American 
benefits. The exit process would take approximately six 
months to go into effect.41 This has ramifications across 
the board, but specifically for liquefied natural gas. 
The United States would no longer have a Free Trade 
Agreement with Mexico, and with Canada, the U.S. 
would fall back on the FTA signed in 1987. This would 
halt LNG exports to Mexico entirely, the chief importer 
of U.S. natural gas. Additionally, tariff rates would rise to 
the levels established under the WTO. This would mean 
tariffs that were generally 0 percent on almost all goods 
traded among the three countries could hit an average of 
more than 7 percent in Mexico, 3 percent in the United 
States and 4 percent in Canada. There is no guarantee 
that, should the U.S. withdraw, the other two nations 
would be willing to return to negotiations, which could 
open the door for increased Canadian exports to Mexico 
as they build their LNG infrastructure to circumvent 
American isolationism. Increased tariffs could potentially 
reduce the demand for imported energy goods and 
increase the focus on self-sustainability, particularly in 
Mexico, reverting it back to an inefficient and archaic 
state-run system. It could also undercut the ability to use 
LNG to replace more harmful but cheaper fossil fuels, 
increasing the carbon dioxide output.
Conclusion
The United States has an opportunity to 
be an even bigger player in the trade of liquefied 
natural gas. As the world looks to develop, it 
must also be sustainable. That means pushing 
aside more old-fashioned forms of energy and 
focusing on those that are more affordable and 
widely accessible. Latin America, the Caribbean, 
and other developing regions of the world are 
increasing their demand for natural gas and 
the U.S. has the comparative advantage. With 
the largest shale gas deposit on the continent, 
the supply is enormous. The United States has 
significant infrastructure in LNG production 
already in place. This means stability to investors 
and companies looking to support projects. It 
also means the potential expansion of existing 
facilities to meet demands necessary for global 
output. Conversely, Canada lacks significant 
infrastructure to be a leading global exporter of 
LNG, but it has a significant surplus to export. 
While there is little restriction on shipping to 
 39 “Build Pipelines, Not Walls; Nafta and Energy,” The Economist 
(2017).
40 Editors’ note: indeed, Obrador did win the 2018 election in 
Mexico. He assumed office on December 1.
41 Ana Swanson and Kevin Granville, “What Would Happen If the 
U.S. Withdrew from Nafta,”  New York Times (2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/10/12/business/economy/what-would-happen-
if-the-us-withdrew-from-nafta.html.
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most countries by the Government of Canada, 
the lack of facilities to support exportation 
means the United States has the ability to tap 
the market first, provided it can reduce its 
regulatory obstacles. The potential investment 
deal the United States has struck with China all 
but guarantees an inflow of capital for growing 
LNG exports, which Canada does not have. 
Mexico has no competitive advantage with 
either country. Its exportation infrastructure 
for LNG is non-existent and there is no known 
surplus of natural gas to export. If Mexico can 
tap into its reserves, the best it can do is convert 
energy production to domestic consumption 
and decrease its reliance on foreign imports of 
LNG. North America, through NAFTA and the 
rise of American natural gas production, is on 
track to become energy independent by 2020. 
This will allow the three countries to rely less on 
producers like the unstable Persian Gulf states 
and Venezuela. It drives costs down and creates a 
consistent supply of sustainable energy.
Whether or not the United States 
withdraws from NAFTA, it needs to relax 
the standards of trade in LNG. Barring grave 
concerns over national security, trade with 
non-FTA countries should be a priority for the 
Office of Fossil Energy. Not only is it a fail-safe 
against the potential loss of large export markets 
should the U.S. renege on trade deals, but it also 
provides sustainable development to countries 
who need energy infrastructure to progress. 
It incentivizes nations to ditch coal-burning 
energy production in the developing world, 
which should lead to cleaner development. The 
fears of large energy consumers can be curbed 
partially by ensuring a consistent domestic 
supply no matter what the desired output may 
be, similar to the way the trade is handled in 
Canada. Additionally, those nations that lack free 
trade agreements with the U.S., once granted 
LNG exportation and importation privileges, 
would not necessarily have access to national 
treatment. This means the United States has the 
ability to inflate prices abroad to ensure there is 
no advantage given to foreign firms, promoting 
competition across various sectors. The United 
States has the capacity to be a sustainable energy 
provider to a larger section of the world. For 
the U.S. to ascend to the position of world’s 
leading producer of liquefied natural gas, it is 
necessary to invest more heavily and publically 
in the infrastructure allowing exportation of the 
product on mass scales, and to expand the scope 
of export markets. This is vital to the stability 
and prosperity of the energy sector the economy.
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The End of NAFTA and 
a Future for Companies 
in the Medical Device 
Industry
MELISSA GUIMOND and JENNIFER KROUSE, 
with KYLE BEAUREGARD
In 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) created one of the world’s largest free trade zones and established the foundation for economic growth and increased prosperity for 
Canada, the United States, and Mexico. This essay sets 
out to examine how proposed changes to NAFTA could 
affect the Medical Device Industry.1  In recent weeks, 
U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to scrap 
NAFTA or limit the number of economic sectors that 
“free trade” with Canada and Mexico could encompass. 
Were this to happen, the medical device industry 
could be impacted in both positive and negative ways. 
These possible changes create positive impacts for both 
Canada and Mexico. Most of the possibly negative 
changes directly impact the United States. Our research 
analyzes external environmental factors and the industry 
as a whole. We look at how the proposed changes 
could affect three major companies operating in the 
NAFTA region: GE Healthcare, Johnson & Johnson, 
and Medtronic. Through our research, we are able to 
generate potential strategies for each of these companies 
should the possible changes to NAFTA occur. 
 While studying the impact of the potential 
changes of NAFTA in regard to the Medical Device 
Industry, we first need to learn about how the industry 
is currently doing and how potential changes proposed 
could affect the industry. Our research of the Medical 
Device Industry uses a strategic audit approach to 
analyze and make recommendations to the top three 
companies in the NAFTA region. Were NAFTA to 
be scrapped or severely limited, there are a number of 
likely impacts on the Medical Device Industry in the 
United States. First, Mexico and Canada could retaliate 
by imposing restrictions on United States products 
that currently have favorable trade terms and high sales 
volume. Second, there is the potential for a lower trade 
deficit between Mexico and Canada. Third, scrapping 
NAFTA might bring about an end to the Value-added 
Tax (VAT). The VAT is a type of general consumption 
tax that is added incrementally throughout each stage 
of production or distribution. This would increase 
profit margins for many companies, including those in 
medical device production. Lastly, there could be more 
complications involved when American-owned factories 
stationed in Mexico are moved back to the United States 
(Varney, 2017).  
Context
Our research includes an assessment of the industry as a 
whole within the NAFTA countries, its top sectors, top 
trends, and the current performance of GE Healthcare, 
Johnson & Johnson and Medtronic. We also use 
Porter’s Five Forces, a tool to analyze the competition 
of businesses, to assess the Medical Device Industry. It 
 1 Editors’ note. This essay was written in early Spring 2018, months 
before the October 2018 conclusion of negotiations resulting in 
the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), the 
successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
This scholarship provides scholarly insight into the subject that was 
available at that moment.
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Figure 1: Basic Facts about Healthcare in NAFTA’s Three Countries
 Canada Mexico United States
Population 35,099,836 121,736,809 321,368,864
Total Healthcare 
Spending
$186 Billion $82 Billion $3 Trillion
Healthcare expenditures 









Gov’t 52%, Private 48% Gov’t 48%, 
Private 52%




$5 Billion USD $147.7 Billion 
USD
is a five-force model that determines the competitive 
intensity or attractiveness of a company in regard to 
its profitability. Figure 1 details some basic facts about 
the medical device industry within Canada, Mexico 
and the United States. The US dollar is very strong 
and constitutes one of the reasons why the medical 
device market is on the rise. However, the strong dollar 
creates challenges for American device manufacturers 
exporting to markets with weaker currencies (Corpart, 
2018). Comparing the NAFTA countries gives a deeper 
understanding of how each country values healthcare 
and the medical device industry.       
The Frost & Sullivan website provides a complete 
2017 snapshot of the Medical Device Industry. 
According to it, the top five sectors of 2017 were: 
structural heart, robotics and robot assistance, neuro-
devices, integrated patient monitoring devices, and 
diabetes care. Some of the top technology trends relate 
directly to the top sectors, such as the revolution of 
diabetes care, surgical robots, and devices that connect 
cars and trucks with health sensors. Health sensors 
placed on the steering wheels of cars can detect heart 
attacks, seizures and other health conditions that could 
happen while driving (though this device is still in the 
early development stage). With innovation in medical 
devices, though, there are always some unexpected issues 
that occur. In 2017, some of the concerns raised by 
innovation in the medical device industry included those 
concerning a restrictive regulatory environment, the 
speed of technology, the ability to raise capital to fund 
innovations and the changes in customer behavior and 
demands. The medical industry is constantly changing 
and it is extremely difficult to make sure that products 
and devices are reliable.  In 2017, there was also a 
transformation in the medical device industry ecosystem. 
Companies in this sector developed a connected 
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ecosystem of sensors and devices that are readily available 
to individuals and that serve the functions of identifying, 
capturing and measuring health data, stratifying risks, 
informing patients of conditions, and helping them and 
their physicians to make decisions and take action. These 
sensors and devices can be placed on an individual’s 
body, in their homes, in community centers, in clinics 
and, of course, in hospitals (Frost & Sullivan, 2017). 
These sensors are extremely important for innovation 
for consumers, such as those with diabetes, who use 
them multiple times a day to check blood sugar levels. 
The medical device industry is constantly changing 
and evolving with new technologies. These changes can 
be seen in the current performances of the companies 
Medtronic, Johnson & Johnson, and GE Healthcare.
Medtronic
Medtronic is a Global Healthcare and Medical 
Device company located in Mansfield, Massachusetts. 
Medtronic’s mission statement claims that its first 
priority is “to contribute to human welfare by 
application of biomedical engineering in the research, 
design, manufacture, and sale of instruments or 
appliances that alleviate pain, restore health, and extend 
life” (Medtronic). Medtronic is growing innovation in 
the area of biomedical engineering. In 2017, it invested 
more than $2 Billion in research and development, 
which represented 7.4% of the company’s net sales that 
year. Medtronic also launched labs to bring about new 
initiatives to deliver financially sustainable businesses 
that expand access and reduce health inequality in 
emerging countries (Vivanco, 2017). Medtronic was 
a very charitable company in 2017. It donated more 
than $101 million to charitable causes in corporate cash 
contributions given through the Medtronic Foundation, 
in product donations and through employee 
volunteering. The four main product and service 
focuses of Medtronic are cardiac and vascular afflictions, 
restorative therapies, diabetes, and minimally invasive 
therapies. 
Johnson & Johnson
Johnson & Johnson is the world’s largest independent 
biotech company with a market cap of $343.8 Billion. 
A manufacturer of medical devices, pharmaceutical 
and consumer packaged goods, it is an American 
multinational company that was founded in 1886, with 
its headquarters in New Brunswick, New Jersey. In the 
third quarter of 2017, Johnson & Johnson’s revenue in 
its medical device section was a little more than $19,650 
Million. In Johnson & Johnson’s medical device section, 
the main products they focus on involve general surgery, 
energy science, endocutters, biosurgery, infection 
prevention and wound closure. Medical device sales 
account for 35% of the company’s value. As a company 
that has been around for more than 100 years, Johnson 
& Johnson has been and will continue to be a leader of 
innovation in the medical field.  By 2024, the company’s 
forecasting predicts that its revenue will be around 
$29 Billion. (Johnson & Johnson - Medical Device). 
Johnson & Johnson’s future growth concerns include 
changing healthcare needs for an aging population, 
changing dynamics in the women’s health market, price 
regulation, and developing minimally invasive surgery 
procedures to reduce infections. Johnson & Johnson 
continues to be the world’s leader of innovation among 
biotech companies. 
GE Healthcare
GE Healthcare is a sector of GE Capital, whose parent 
company is General Electric (GE). GE Healthcare offers 
transformational medical technologies and services that 
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are shaping a new age of patient care (GE Healthcare). 
In the third quarter of 2017, GE Healthcare had revenue 
of $4.724 Million, with the medical device segment 
recording a profit of $820 Million. The operation 
profit of the third quarter of 2017 was 17.4%. GE 
Healthcare’s main product categories include accessories 
and supplies, the GE Health Cloud, bone and metabolic 
health, advanced visualization, computed tomography, 
clinical consumables, applied intelligence and anesthesia 
delivery. The GE Health Cloud is “designed to be a 
scalable, secure, connected and interoperable platform, 
delivering the largest application ecosystem for the 
healthcare industry” (GE Health Cloud). It is capable 
of being connected to more than 500,000 GE medical 
imaging machines and more than 1.5 million imaging 
machines worldwide. GE Healthcare is making strides 
in cloud technology to make the healthcare and medical 
world more interconnected.
Porter’s Five Forces
The health of the medical device industry can be gauged 
using Porter’s Five Forces, a common methodology 
that guides analysis of an industry and the competitors 
within it. Porter’s Five Forces are the threat of new 
entrants, rivalry among existing firms, the availability 
of substitutes, bargaining power among buyers, and 
bargaining power among suppliers. Under the first 
force, threat of new entrants, we find that it is extremely 
difficult for new companies to enter this industry due 
to high barriers from strict government regulations. 
The industry is also dominated by a few large and top 
companies who have strong brand images and long-term 
reputations. Barriers to entry include strict regulations 
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 
such as approvals, requirements, and registrations, as 
well as copyrights and patents. One scholar explains 
the barriers of entry: “There are strict medical device 
regulations for product approval by the FDA, which 
include establishment registration, medical device listing, 
PMA (501) K or premarket approval, investigational 
device exemption (IDE) for clinical studies, quality 
system regulation, labeling requirements and medical 
device reporting (MDR). Couple this with the need for 
copyrights and patents and the barrier rises even higher 
to enter this industry” (UKEssays, 2017). 
 In regard to the second force, rivalry amongst 
existing firms, there are eight major competitors in this 
industry. They are Medtronic, Abbott Laboratories, 
Johnson & Johnson, GE Healthcare, Tyco International, 
Boston Scientific, Welch Allyn, and Siemens. The 
medical device industry is rapidly growing and 
constantly changing as a result of new innovations in 
healthcare and technology. Products in this industry 
are typically items found in hospitals, doctors’ offices, 
emergency rooms, and other healthcare facilities. These 
include items such as X-Ray machines, MRI machines, 
beds, monitors, cardiac devices such as pacemakers, 
internal cameras, IV bags, and more. These products also 
have high fixed costs associated with them. The third 
force is substitute products. There are no substitutes 
for these products as they are very specific and cannot 
conceivably be replaced. The threat of new substitutes, as 
a result, is very low. 
 The fourth and fifth forces are the bargaining 
power of buyers and suppliers, respectively. First, 
buyers: quite simply, they do not have the ability to 
force down prices. Hospitals and doctors’ offices may 
be able to get deals or discounts when making bulk/
large or frequent purchases. Alternative suppliers exist 
in competitors outside of the United States in Mexico 
and Canada. The importance of these products to the 
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buyers is evident: these medical devices save and improve 
lives. The bargaining power of suppliers is different; they 
can affect the industry with their ability to raise prices. 
They can also contribute to making healthcare more 
expensive. As stated before, the industry is dominated by 
a few companies. Of the eight competitors, the top ones 
are GE Healthcare, Johnson & Johnson, Medtronic, 
Siemens, and Boston Scientific. Their products have 
unique characteristics and are unique themselves. 
Some examples of these products are artificial joints 
and limbs, stents, orthopedic appliances, surgical 
dressings, disposable surgical drapes, hydrotherapy 
appliances, surgical kits, rubber medical and surgical 
gloves, wheelchairs, anesthesia apparatus, orthopedic 
instruments, optical diagnostic apparatus, blood 
transfusion devices, syringes, hypodermic needles, and 
catheters.
Methodology
Data on how these companies and products might 
fare with the end of NAFTA can be organized into 
two tables. The first of these is our External Factors 
Analysis Summary (EFAS) table. The second table is our 
Industry Matrix Analysis. These two tables are crucial 
for planning strategies for the three companies we 
focus on here: GE Healthcare, Johnson & Johnson and 
Medtronic. By utilization of these tables, we can come to 
some useful conclusions.
 The External Factors Analysis table acts as a 
means to track the external factors within an industry. 
Prospective changes to NAFTA pose many possible risks 
and opportunities for the healthcare industry. The EFAS 
table helps clarify these opportunities and threats. Our 
research relied on news of the current renegotiations 
of NAFTA through news sites and online newspapers 
(Harwood, 2017). During this research, it was difficult 
to indicate which possible outcomes could occur because 
the negotiations changed pace so quickly and often 
(Heath). The EFAS table lists the opportunities and 
threats that came with each possible change, and how it 
would affect the healthcare and medical device industry 
as a whole. 
Opportunities refer to the advantages that would 
come with specific changes within NAFTA. Here, we 
found five important advantages that would directly 
impact the healthcare and medical device industry. 
Opportunities included lowering the trade deficit 
between the US and Mexico and getting rid of the VAT 
(Harwood, 2017). Threats act as negative effects that 
would hurt the current environment of the healthcare 
and medical device industry. Here, we found five 
threats, including the end of the Maquiladora program 
and the end of resolution panels (Harwood, 2017). 
These two direct elements could affect the medical 
device industry, causing devices sold outside the United 
States to be much more expensive. Given that a large 
amount of manufacturing for medical devices is done 
in Mexico, these two threats would increase the cost of 
manufacturing these products and in turn cause them to 
be more expensive for leading healthcare companies.
The second table is the industry matrix table, which. 
allows us to organize our findings but also to narrow 
down specifics to individual companies within the 
United States, namely Medtronic, Johnson & Johnson, 
and GE Healthcare. The industry matrix lists the 
key success factors needed in order for each of these 
companies to achieve success in the healthcare industry. 
However, each company takes these success factors and 
prioritizes them differently. By using the matrix table 
we are able to show how GE Healthcare, Johnson & 
Johnson, and Medtronic rank each of these success 
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External Factors Weights Rates Comments
Opportunities:
Lower trade deficit between US 
and Mexico 0.05 4 Lowers deficit with Mexico
Get rid of VAT Tax 0.05 3 Gets rid of added tax
Eliminate unfair subsidies 0.1 5 Eliminates extra subsidies for healthcare
Opportunity to impose tariffs 
without permission to congress 0.05 2
Allows tariffs to be added without the 
approval of Congress
Mexico develops internal 
healthcare 0.2 1.5 Mexico to develops their own healthcare
Threats:
End of Maquiladora program 0.05 1
Ends the permit that allows Mexico to 
import duty free
Update rule of origin 0.1 3
Ends the advice and discussion between 
FDA and medical device sponsors
End of resolution panel 0.1 2
Medical devices from Mexico would 
become more expensive
Medical devices from Mexico 
more expensive 0.25 3
Potential loss of jobs/work 0.05 2.5
Total: 1.00
Figure 2: External Factors Analysis











Innovation 0.2 1 5 0.8 4 1 5
FDA Approval 0.16 0.8 5 0.8 5 0.8 5
Product Development 0.1 0.4 4 0.3 3 0.5 5
Reliable Products 0.15 0.6 4 0.6 4 0.6 4
Top Service Maintenance 0.12 0.36 3 0.6 5 0.48 4
Sales and Marketing 
Effectiveness 0.08 0.4 5 0.24 3 0.32 4
Product Lifecycle 
Management 0.13 0.52 4 0.52 4 0.52 4
Reputation 0.06 0.3 5 0.3 5 0.18 3
Total: 1
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factors. This allows an overview of each company and 
illustrates the main focuses of each leading healthcare 
company. For example, by looking at the first key success 
factor it, is clear that Medtronic and GE Healthcare list 
innovation higher than Johnson & Johnson does (GE 
Healthcare). At the same time, Johnson & Johnson 
ranks service maintenance higher than both Medtronic 
and GE Healthcare (Johnson & Johnson). This shows 
that each company has different focuses and relies on 
different key success factors in order to achieve success.
Findings
Based upon the information presented in the external 
factor analysis summary and industry matrix analysis, we 
can devise strategies for the three companies mentioned 
above, both generally and in relation to possible 
changes in NAFTA. For GE Healthcare, capitalizing 
on innovation is paramount in importance given the 
company’s goals noted in the industry matrix. It ranked 
innovation as one of its top success factors and therefore 
would be focusing on it in the future (GE Healthcare). 
However, due to possible changes in NAFTA, GE’s focus 
on innovation may prove costly. Mexico manufactures 
a large amount of medical devices for these three 
companies and if any of the threats listed in the EFAS 
table occur, innovative technology will not be cheap. In 
light of this, making operations more efficient through 
automation will be useful should the outsourcing of 
manufacturing result in increased costs. Overall, GE 
Healthcare should continue to pursue innovation in 
medical devices, especially in image archiving and cloud 
visualization tools. Outsourcing and operation of devices 
could become more expensive for factories in Mexico, 
and therefore the company should work on ways to 
make the operation process more efficient by using 
automated robotics.
 In contrast, Medtronic should continue to 
focus its efforts on charity in order to improve the 
company’s reputation (Medtronic, 2016). By increasing 
its focus on charity events and building a better 
reputation, consumers will be more likely to trust 
and use Medtronic healthcare and services. This type 
of company strategy will bring more popular favor 
toward it and set it apart from its competitors. Like GE 
Healthcare, innovation is also important to Medtronic 
and, because of that, automation is also a key factor 
in Medtronic’s future success. Building the company’s 
reputation will also cultivate more trust from consumers. 
This will in the long run build clientele and give the 
company a competitive edge. Finally, Medtronic should 
also focus on automated manufacturing and increase 
research in its diabetes group, since that is its lowest 
profit group within the company. These key goals will 
allow Medtronic to continue to flourish, even after the 
NAFTA negotiations are complete.
Lastly, Johnson & Johnson should focus on 
its work in the field of minimally invasive surgery (or 
MIS) procedures (Johnson & Johnson). Evidence from 
Johnson & Johnson shows that innovation within the 
medical device field is not as important to the company’s 
focus as it is to GE Healthcare and Medtronic. Instead, 
Johnson & Johnson shows more interest in alternate 
forms of innovation, including those that aim to reduce 
infection rates. Emphasis on these procedures will set 
the company apart from its competitors. Due to possible 
changes from the NAFTA negotiations related to 
manufacturing, Johnson & Johnson’s focus on innovative 
procedures minimizes the need for reconfiguring its 
business model. These require little need for outsourcing 
manufacturing which may become more expensive as 
a result of NAFTA’s renegotiation. MIS procedures are 
also expected to be at a higher demand than they are 
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currently, which will mean a competitive advantage for 
Johnson & Johnson over its leading competitors. 
Conclusion
The goal of this research project has been to analyze 
the medical device industry and its ties to NAFTA. It 
describes the context, business focuses and prospects for 
three top companies in the medical device industry: GE 
Healthcare, Johnson & Johnson, and Medtronic, and 
considers how the scenario of the Trump Administration 
pulling the U.S. out of the trade agreement would 
affect each one. Our study identifies strategies that 
each of the companies could implement if the Trump 
administration were to pull the United States out of 
the North American Free Trade Agreement. While 
Medtronic’s focus on charity is a great way to improve 
its reputation, the company should also increase research 
in its diabetes group since that is its lowest profit group. 
GE Healthcare should continue to increase innovation 
in medical devices, especially in image archiving and 
cloud visualization tools. Outsourcing and operation of 
devices could become more expensive for factories in 
Mexico, so the company should work on ways to make 
the operation process more efficient with automation 
by using robotics. Finally, Johnson & Johnson should 
continue to focus its efforts on innovation in minimally 
invasive surgeries (MIS) as well as other Healthcare 
services. MIS procedures are expected to be at a higher 
demand than they are currently, and this strategy 
would give Johnson & Johnson an advantage over its 
competitors.
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Debunking the Narratives 
of Inclusion: Immigration 
Policy in Quebec, Canada, 
and the United States in the 
Age of Trump
OLIVIA A. KURAJIAN
Narratives of inclusion and successful immigration stories permeate Canadian popular culture. Often compared as an equally desirable destination to the 
United States, Canada is frequently heralded as a refuge 
for immigrants; specifically, those seeking asylum. 
Frequently exalted as a morally superior nation to its 
southerly neighbors, Canada represents itself in the 
international arena as a country that celebrates, respects, 
and cares for all of its members—regardless of their 
sometimes precarious immigration status by emphasizing 
the multiculturalism of Canadian society. Such stories 
also permeate national history and therefore leave out 
the voices of the “other” and ignore episodes of overt 
discrimination. As such, this account of the Canadian 
narrative as a welcoming safe harbor is not always 
accurate as globalization and concerns over national 
security threaten to uproot the hegemonic perpetuation 
of racial stereotypes and justifications of exclusion. 
Illustrating these failures of the Canadian government 
to uphold its revered image, are the stories of Abdoul 
Abdi, a Somalian refugee who faced deportation after 
the Canadian government neglected to apply for his 
citizenship while he was a minor in the foster care 
system; and those of Haitian refugees once living in the 
United States with protected status crossing into Quebec 
by the hundreds in 2017 to seek asylum in Canada. 
With the aid of the two aforementioned case studies, 
explored through review of academic literature and news 
stories, this paper seeks to dismantle the commonly 
believed fallacies surrounding the immigration and 
refugee policies in the United States, Canada, and 
Quebec in the Age of Trump.
Stories are integral to the remembering of the 
past and the shaping of the future. National narratives 
are created, reinforced, and bolstered to suit political 
motives. Sometimes, however, these narratives are 
dissected and examined to reveal fallacies and insidious 
hegemony. In the United States, Theodor Seuss Geisel, 
more commonly known by his penname Dr. Seuss, 
challenged national histories in his children’s books and 
cartoons. Specifically concerned with environmental, 
social, and political problems plaguing the United 
States and world, Dr. Seuss is still celebrated today as 
an activist and beloved storyteller. A political cartoon 
from 1941 created by Seuss criticized America’s policy 
on denying European Jews escaping the Holocaust entry 
to the United States. It read, “…and the world chewed 
up the children and spit out their bones. But those were 
foreign children and it didn’t really matter.” Additionally, 
the depiction of the mother figure is seen wearing a 
shirt that boasts the words, “America First!” This type 
of egocentric rhetoric mimics that of the political 
climate of the United States in the Age of Trump as 
neoliberal policies and laws restricting immigration to 
the country are aimed to “Make America Great Again” 
(Gilbert, 2017). This idealization of the role that strict 
immigration policies can play in society can be a tool to 
perpetuate discrimination. Yet, discriminatory policies 
are not limited within the borders of the United States 
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and are additionally visible in Quebec and Canada.   
As a result, stories told in the United States, 
Canada, and Quebec concerning immigration are not 
only inaccurate, but also dangerous. Canadian popular 
culture promotes multiculturalism and inclusion in line 
with the country’s 1988 Official Multiculturalism Act, 
which was passed at the federal level of government. 
Yet, the reality of multiculturalism often differs from the 
official policy as immigrant groups are often confronted 
by barriers following their emigration from their home 
countries. Instead of successful multiculturalism wherein 
immigrants are encouraged to retain their heritage and 
practice their customs, the reality is assimilationist 
in nature (Lambert and Taylor, 1988). Hence, an 
imagined collective national history minimizes the 
plight of those unable to fit into this vision of the 
typical Canadian immigrant that assimilates easily 
into society. Quebec, with its additional immigration 
policies and requirements, furthers the perpetuation of 
exclusion within the Canadian federation as it favors 
interculturalism rather than multiculturalism. The 
paradigm of interculturalism seeks to unite diverse 
groups and promote integration of newcomers into 
society. Multiculturalism, as imagined by the Canadian 
federal government, is founded upon the idea that all 
cultures are equal and can exist more independently 
of one another under the mirage of pluralism and 
inclusion (Meer, 2016). Thus, interculturalism and 
multiculturalism are tools that aid Canada and Quebec 
in being viewed as more inclusive and less discriminatory 
than their neighbors to the south, who are regarded 
in popular culture as a “melting pot.” Canadian 
exceptionalism often overshadows the crimes committed 
against immigrants and asylum seekers north of the 
United States border. The dialogue sparked through the 
campaign and later election of United States President 
Donald Trump continues to unravel the alarming racism 
embedded in American society and, thus, Canadians are 
compelled to examine their own biases and problematic 
immigration policies. The first case study to be examined 
in this paper is the story of Abdoul Abdi, a Somalian 
refugee who faced deportation after the Canadian 
government neglected to apply for his citizenship while 
he was a minor in the foster care system. The second 
case study focuses on the plight of Haitian refugees once 
living in the United States with protected status crossing 
into Quebec by the hundreds in 2017 to seek asylum 
in Canada. These two examples encapsulate the way in 
which the North American continent is rife with racism 
and exclusion, specifically in regard to immigration 
policy and unofficial practice.
The official stories that these North American 
nations promote are shockingly different, as the 
narratives of “Land of the Free and The Home of the 
Brave” and “The True North Strong and Free” contrast 
with the reality of racism and exclusion. With the aid of 
the two aforementioned case studies, explored through 
a review of academic literature and news stories, this 
paper seeks to dismantle the commonly believed fallacies 
surrounding inclusivity of immigration and refugee 
policies in the United States, Canada, and Quebec in the 
Age of Trump.
Global migrants are charged with overwhelming 
responsibility as they leave their homes and families 
in search of settlement or seek asylum someplace else. 
Application delays, financial difficulties, linguistic 
challenges, unestablished or under-established ties 
to the new community, or barriers to access to social 
services are common (Aubrey, 2017). One of the 
most difficult and important challenges faced by 
refugees and immigrants is the access to healthcare 
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both in their countries of origin and in their new 
homes (Liu, 2016). As such, language barriers, lack of 
information about how to access or navigate services, 
long wait lists, and lack of culturally suited services in 
the destination country contribute to the dilemma of 
improper or insufficient healthcare amongst immigrants 
to both the United States and Canada (Kalich, 2016). 
Canadian exceptionalism is present in the reality of 
public healthcare. While it is true that immigrants 
can be eligible for coverage under the public plan, vast 
inequalities exist in the care that is received and the 
timeline in which it is provided (Lu, Kaushal, Denier 
and Wang, 2017). For the very old and the very young, 
this reality is felt even more strongly (Yeo, 2017). Long 
waitlists for surgeries, difficulty in accessing family care 
physicians and the price of pharmaceutical drugs can be 
overwhelming to newcomers. Also, access to the public 
regime of healthcare can take months to secure as there is 
often a waiting period and varying criteria to be satisfied 
before the issue of a card. This discrepancy between real 
and imagined narratives can cause confusion and distress 
in immigrant populations and can contribute to further 
displacement and insecurities (Browne, Kumar, Puente-
Duran, Georgiades, Leckie and Jenkins, 2017).
Furthermore, especially following the 2010 
Haitian earthquake, Haitian migrants to the United 
States spiked in numbers. Yet, under Donald Trump’s 
administration, the protected status of these Haitian 
nationals soon ended (Campbell, 2017). Haitians living 
in the United States under this protected status therefore 
have three choices. The first would be to go into hiding 
in the United States and risk deportation and isolation. 
The second choice is to return to Haiti at their own risk, 
where the economic, political, and social conditions 
are still dire. The third option would be to attempt to 
cross into Canada, and most specifically Quebec, where 
the majority of the population speaks French. This 
linguistic factor is especially important as knowledge 
of the majority language directly corresponds to work 
opportunities and education (Abelson, 2017). Many 
Haitians that cross into Canada face a 90% rejection rate 
for their refugee claimant applications, filed after illegally 
entering the country (Campbell, 2017). Temporary 
shelters, being in Quebec and Ontario, place further 
burden on an already financially stressed and backlogged 
immigrant processing system (Press, 2017). Haitian 
refugee claimants make up a visible portion of the nearly 
50,000 applications awaiting review in Canada this year 
(Markusoff, 2018).
Consequently, discourses surrounding Haitian 
asylum seekers that migrate from the United States to 
Canada often ignore the direct contribution of these 
two countries to the deplorable realities currently facing 
Haiti, and more generally the global South (Esses, 
2017). Policies of exploitation of labor and resources 
have shaped Haiti both in colonial and neo-colonial 
times. With Canada and the United States as active 
participants in the problems facing Haiti, even more so 
following the devastating earthquake at the beginning 
of the decade, North America owes Haiti a substantial 
debt. From environmental exploitation to human 
displacement and dispossession, Canada and the United 
States have ravaged Haiti. Moreover, the United States 
explicitly removed its clause about America being 
a nation of immigrants from the U.S. Citizenship 
and Immigration Services mandate (Hjelmgard, 
2018). The previous mission statement read: “USCIS 
secures America’s promise as a nation of immigrants 
by providing accurate and useful information to our 
customers, granting immigration and citizenship 
benefits, promoting an awareness and understanding 
of citizenship, and ensuring the integrity of our 
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immigration system.” The current mission statement 
says: “U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
administers the nation’s lawful immigration system, 
safeguarding its integrity and promise by efficiently and 
fairly adjudicating requests for immigration benefits 
while protecting Americans, securing the homeland, and 
honoring our values” (Tropp & Okamoto, 2018).
Both the current and former statements 
employ the word “integrity.” In the mandate put forth 
by Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada 
(IRCC), there is no mention of integrity and instead, 
the Canadian government seeks to “maintain Canada’s 
humanitarian tradition by protecting refugees and 
people in need of protection” (Citizenship Canada, 
2018).
The aforementioned “tradition” of protecting 
refugees and the propagation of a just immigration 
system is misleading. The tradition of the Canadian 
government has been to exclude migrants from entering 
the country’s borders based upon race and religion. 
The tradition extends from Chinese Head Taxes to the 
rejection of Jewish migrants escaping war-torn Europe 
and the atrocities of the Holocaust. These policies, both 
official and unofficial were rife with overt discrimination. 
Meanwhile, around the time of Canadian 
Confederation, thousands of British subjects were 
welcomed with opened hearts. The open-door-policy was 
viewed as a progressive and positive endeavour but was 
laden with racism and exclusion (Décoste, 2014). This 
imagined humanitarianism is further debunked with 
the case study of 25-year-old, Abdoul Abdi. Abdi, who 
came as a child and grew up alongside Canadian citizens, 
never believed that he was anything but. As a minor 
in the foster care system for over a decade, he should 
have been properly cared for as a ward of the Canadian 
state. He recently was released from prison after serving 
four-and-a-half years with charges including aggravated 
assault. 
Yet, following his release, he was immediately 
detained by the Canada Border Services Agency 
on immigration grounds. He spent months facing 
deportation to Somalia, a country where he had never 
set foot. He was born in Saudi Arabia to Somali parents 
and following his mother’s death, Abdi came to Canada 
at age six with his aunt. According a CBC article from 
January 2018, Abdi wants the Canadian government 
to do a better job with managing the foster care system 
countrywide. The article goes on to say that now that 
he is out of prison, Abdi said he is no longer a danger 
to society and just wants to be a father to his child. 
After spending his childhood in 31 placements within 
Nova Scotia’s foster care system and with no secondary 
education, Abdi wishes to remain a constant figure in his 
child’s life (Zimonjic, 2018).
Just as Abdi’s child will grow up with the 
influence of Canadian norms and narratives, Abdoul 
Abdi was a product of the Canadian state (Williams, 
2018a). Abdi’s story is not unique as religious or ethnic 
minorities are often not given proper resources in the 
foster care system. This furthers the notion that within 
the social, political, and economic domains of Canadian 
and American society there exists ongoing pervasive 
racism and a deeply embedded colonial story (Williams, 
2018b). As such, two advocacy groups have intervened 
on behalf of Abdi for his judicial review. Both the 
Canadian Civil Liberties Association and Justice for 
Children and Youth groups believe that the country has 
failed Abdi (Canadian Press, 2018). Abdoul Abdi stands 
as a symbol of the inequality and racism woven into 
Canada’s immigration policies and further diminishes 
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the belief of Canadian exceptionalism. 
 The Canadian government’s detainment, 
deportation, and deplorable treatment of certain 
individuals in precarious situations of “status” within 
Canada is often exacerbated if one belongs to a 
racialized minority group. Yet, for immigrants to the 
United States, obtaining American citizenship was 
less “identity-changing” and more of a logical “next 
step” in the procedural trajectory of naturalization. In 
contrast to this bleak regard for citizenship, immigrants 
to Canada were more likely to respond with pride for 
Canadian citizenship and a feeling of inclusion within 
the Canadian mosaic (Aptekar, 2016). However, these 
responses were complicated and challenged by race and 
status upon arriving in the new country. 
Narratives of inclusion and successful 
immigration stories saturate Canadian popular culture. 
Often considered as an equally desirable destination to 
the United States, Canada is frequently heralded as a 
refuge for immigrants seeking asylum. Frequently exalted 
as a morally superior nation to its southerly neighbors, 
Canada represents itself in the international arena as 
a country that celebrates, respects, and cares for all of 
its members—regardless of their sometimes precarious 
immigration status by emphasizing the multiculturalism 
of Canadian society. 
Such stories also permeate national history and 
therefore leave out the voices of the “other” and ignore 
episodes of overt discrimination. As such, this account 
of the Canadian anecdote as a welcoming safe harbor is 
not always accurate as globalization and concerns over 
national security threaten to uproot the hegemonic 
perpetuation of racial stereotypes and justifications of 
exclusion. Excluded from these narratives are the Haitian 
nationals seeking asylum in the Canadian federation 
with the looming reality that their protective status in 
the United States is coming to an end in 2019. Excluded 
from this account is Abdoul Abdi, a product of his 
environment within Canada, not in spite of it. These 
case studies are only two of the thousands each year that 
serve to obliterate Canadian exceptionalism. Quebec, 
Canada, and the United States in the Age of Trump 
are just as they have always been. They have been, and 
continue to be built on stolen land and both sustained 
and bettered by diverse immigration. Whether or not the 
national narratives will ever align with this reality is to be 
determined.
73 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY
References
Abelson, D. E. and V.M. Esses. 2017. Twenty-first-
Century Immigration to North America: 
Newcomers in Turbulent Times. Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Aptekar, S. 2016. “Making Sense of Naturalization: 
What Citizenship Means to Naturalizing 
Immigrants in Canada and the USA.” Journal of 
International Migration and Integration. 17 (4): 
1143-1161. 
Aubrey, C., R. Chari, B.F. Mitchell and Z. Mumtaz. 
2017. “Gender of Provider Barrier to Immigrant 
Women’s Obstetrical Care: A Narrative Review.” 
Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology Canada. 39 
(7): 567-577.
Browne, D. T., A. Kumar, S. Puente-Duran, K. 
Georgiades, G. Leckie and J. Jenkins. 2017. 
“Emotional Problems among Recent Immigrants 
and Parenting Status: Findings from a National 
Longitudinal Study of Immigrants in Canada. 
PloS One, 12(4). Retrieved from: https://
journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/
journal.pone.0175023.
Canadian Press. 2018. “Two groups seek intervener 
status at former child refugee Abdoul Abdi’s 





Campbell, M. 2017. “Haitian asylum seekers are about 
to test Canada’s refugee system in a big way.” 
Maclean’s. 20 December. Retrieved 4 March 
Olivia A. Kurajian is a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) 
candidate specializing in Canadian and Quebec Studies 
at McGill University. She is the founder and President 
of the Quebec Studies Student Association (QSSA) for 
2017-2019, and the Vice-President Finance of Canadian 
Studies Association for Undergraduate Students (CSAUS) 
for 2018-2019. She is energetic, friendly, and loves 
to write. Her biggest inspiration is her two-year-old 
daughter, Evelyn Rose.




Kalich, A., L. Heinemann and S. Ghahari. 2016. “A 
Scoping Review of Immigrant Experience of 
Health Care Access Barriers in Canada.” Journal 
of Immigrant Minority Health. 18 (3): 697-709. 
Koyama, J. 2017. “For Refugees, the Road to 
Employment in the United States is Paved with 
Workable Uncertainties and Controversies.” 
Sociological Forum, 32 (3): 501-521.
Lambert, W.E. and D.M. Taylor. 1988. Sociological 
Forum, 3 (72). Retrieved at: https://doi-org.
proxy3.library.mcgill.ca/10.1007/BF01115124
Liu, Y. 2016. “Differentiation of Self-rated Oral Health 
between American Non-citizens and Citizens.” 
International Dental Journal. 66 (6): 350-355.
Lu, Y., N. Kaushal, N. Denier, and J.S. Wang. 2017. 
“Health of Newly Arrived Immigrants in Canada 
and the United States: Differential Selection on 
Health.” Health & Place, 48: 1-10. 
Matthews, R. 2017. “Canada and the United States: 
Alternate Realities?” Sociological Quarterly, 58 
(3): 340-349. 
Markusoff, J. 2018. “With 41,000 pending claims, 
Canada’s refugee system is failing.” Maclean’s. 











Citizenship Canada. 2018. “Mandate - Immigration, 
Refugees and Citizenship Canada.” Retrieved 
on 27 March from https://www.canada.ca/en/
immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/
mandate.html
CTV News. 2018. “Judge overturns deportation of 
former child refugee.” 16 July. Available at: 
https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/judge-overturns-
deportation-of-former-child-refugee-1.4014845. 
Retrieved on 12 August 2018.
Décoste, R. 2014. “The Racist Truth about Canadian 
Immigration.” Huffington Post. 9 April. Retrieved 
from https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/rachel-
decoste/canada-immigration_b_4747612.html.
Esses, V. M., L.K. Hamilton and D. Gaucher. 2017. 
“The Global Refugee Crisis: Empirical Evidence 
and Policy Implications for Improving Public 
Attitudes and Facilitating Refugee Resettlement.” 
SIPR Social Issues and Policy Review. 11 (1): 78-
123.
Gilbert, S. 2017. “The Complicated Relevance of 
Dr. Seuss’s Political Cartoons.” The Atlantic. 
31 January. Retrieved June 2, 2018, from 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/
archive/2017/01/dr-seuss-protest-icon/515031/.
Hjelmgaard, Kim and Alan Gomez. “America is 
no longer a nation of immigrants.” USA 
Today, 23 February 2018. Retrieved at: www.
75 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY
Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Debating 
the Dividing Lines. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh 
University Press.
Molinaro, D. 2017. Review of A Place in the Sun: Haiti, 
Haitians, and the Remaking of Quebec by Sean 
Mills. Labour / Le Travail, 80: 326-28.
Press, M. C. 2017. “Canada’s U.S. consulates to set 
the record straight on immigration.” Maclean’s. 






Tropp, L.R. and D.G. Okamoto. 2018. “Why a US 
government agency deleted the words ‘nation 




Williams, M. 2018a. “Abdoul Abdi will not be deported. 
But how much of a win is it, really?” Maclean’s. 




——. 2018b. “How Canada’s child welfare system 
fails refugees like Abdoul Abdi.” Maclean’s. 30 
January. Retrieved 4 March 2018 from: http://
www.macleans.ca/opinion/how-canadas-child-
welfare-system-fails-refugees-like-abdoul-abdi/.
Yeo, Y. 2017. “Healthcare Inequality Issues among 
Immigrant Elders after Neoliberal Welfare 
Reform: Empirical Findings from the United 
States.” European Journal of Health Economics: 
Health Economics in Prevention and Care, 18 (5): 
547-65.
Zimonjic, P. 2018. “Abdoul Abdi, refugee facing 
deportation, says he is looking for a second 
chance.” CNC News. 26 January. Retrieved 
4 March 2018 from: http://www.cbc.
ca/news/politics/abdoul-abdi-exclusive-
interview-1.4504760
76 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018 BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY
Fiat Chrysler 
Automobiles and NAFTA’s         
Rule-of-Origin Clause
CHRISTINE HOGAN-BERISHA and PARKER 
MERRITT
One of the most vocal opponents to the Trump Administration’s proposed changes to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is the automobile 
industry because of the impact they will have on 
the established rule-of-origin clause. The clause sets 
eligibility rules for free trade within the NAFTA region 
based on the percentage of a traded good’s components 
that derive from the NAFTA region. Our perspective 
on the issue is taken from the viewpoint of the Fiat 
Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) Corporation. President 
Donald Trump plans to increase the minimum required 
percentage of U.S. components from approximately 
60% to 85%, to which the established automotive 
industry will not be able to adapt without sweeping 
and costly supply-chain and infrastructure overhauls. 
The Canadian Transport Minister has even begun 
open dialog with Michigan’s Governor to emphasize 
Canada’s concern over endangering the longstanding, 
highly integrated auto industry and supply chain 
connecting the two nations. This essay evaluates FCA’s 
current performance; it scans, assesses, and analyzes 
strategic factors to propose the best strategies for the 
company in the face of the proposed changes to the 
rule-of-origin clause.1 The Trump Administration’s 
position on NAFTA is widely criticized and if achieved 
will completely disrupt the auto industry and supply 
chain across the NAFTA member states. It has already 
created uncertainty among automakers, and many had 
to make swift changes to their business decisions in the 
wake of Trump’s 2016 election. Whatever happens with 
President Trump’s attempts to overhaul NAFTA, it is 
clear that there will be winners and losers. As it stands, 
the majority of automakers, including FCA, would say 
that there are more winners under the current NAFTA 
than they expect to be with Trump’s plan.  
In an age where globalism rules, NAFTA fits 
right in. NAFTA is the result of decades of slow progress 
away from America’s isolationist stance on trade since 
World War II. Its passage in 1994 created the largest 
free market existing at that time by opening the trade 
borders between Canada, the United States, and Mexico. 
NAFTA is a multilateral trade agreement that allows for 
the flow of goods and services between the three member 
states with minimal obstruction in terms of tariffs or 
excessive regulations. In its 24 years, the American 
economy has adapted everything from manufacturing 
to agriculture to commodities, and even its services, 
to exploit its benefits of NAFTA. It is strongly favored 
by entities such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
most conservative politicians, and virtually the entire 
automobile industry.
The automobile industry is extremely difficult 
to enter due to significant barriers such as capital 
requirements, supply chains, logistics, labor, and legal 
 1  Editors’ note. This essay was written in early Spring 2018, 
months before the October 2018 conclusion of negotiations 
resulting in the United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement 
(USMCA), the successor to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). This scholarship provides scholarly insight 
into the subject that was available at that moment.
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and regulatory issues. There are dozens of competitors 
across the NAFTA region and overall the industry 
has been growing steadily in the United States and 
globally. The automobile industry has tailored nearly 
every component of its existence to take advantage 
of the current NAFTA. Manufacturing, operations, 
sales and distribution are all strategically located and 
essentially the entire automobile industry supply chain 
is configured to maximize profits under the existing 
conditions (Howes, 2018). The largest potential 
disruption to this is the threat of change to the rule-of-
origin clause.
The rule-of-origin clause sets the required 
percentage of a vehicle’s components that must originate 
in the NAFTA region in order to avoid tariffs. At 
present, 62.5% of the net cost of a passenger car or 
light truck must originate from one of the NAFTA 
member states. The Trump Administration’s proposal is 
to raise that requirement to 85% of the net cost of the 
vehicle (Siekierska, 2017). In addition, it is proposing 
to mandate that 50% of the vehicle’s content originate 
specifically from the United States by placing stricter 
regulations on individual components’ country-of-origin 
certificates. Presently, the country-of-origin certificates 
do not receive as high a level of scrutiny. What the 
Trump Administration proposes is a serious concern for 
suppliers who fear that their materials will not meet the 
new requirements.
Our analysis is based on a review of current 
and historical news articles from established news 
sources, government websites, and peer-reviewed 
scholarly articles. All sources consistently report that 
the automobile industry, including FCA, is not in favor 
of altering the rule-of-origin clause (O’Grady, 2017). 
Repeatedly, it is reported that the proposed changes 
would result in extreme disruptions to the automobile 
industry’s highly integrated supply chain network, 
producing increased automobile prices for consumers 
across the NAFTA region (Vieira and Shaefer Munoz, 
2018). The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board stated 
that ultimately the changes would cause substantial 
damage to the United States’ trade reputation and 
potentially spark a trade war with its closest neighbors. 
In the case of FCA, no source reports that CEO Sergio 
Marchionne2 or top management are in favor of any of 
the proposed changes to NAFTA. However, there were 
numerous examples where the CEO expressed loud 
opposition to Trump’s NAFTA proposals and strong 
support for the existing NAFTA. He emphasized that 
changes would hurt the autoworkers and result in higher 
prices for consumers. This sentiment is echoed by the 
majority of FCA’s competitors’ executives.
A look at FCA’s recent past and present 
performance helps us to understand why. In 2009, 
failing American auto manufacturer Chrysler Group 
LLC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and ownership of 
the company was split between the United Auto Workers 
Pension Fund, Fiat, the U.S. government, and the 
Canadian government. Over the next few years under 
the leadership of CEO Marchionne, Fiat slowly acquired 
the majority ownership of the company and announced 
that FIAT and Chrysler Group LLC would merge into a 
new holding Company called Fiat Chrysler Automobiles 
(FCA) (Vellequette, 2018). Founded in October 2014, it 
is comprised of several automotive brands (Arbarth, Alfa 
Romeo, Chrysler, Dodge, Fiat, Fiat Professional, Jeep, 
2 Editor’s note.  Since the writing of this essay, Sergio Marchionne 
has passed away. He died on 25 July 2018 (www.bloomberg.com, 
25 July 2018).
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Lancia, Maserati, Mopar, Ram, and SRT) and a few 
component and production brands (Comau, Magneti 
Marelli, and Teksid). According to its website, FCA’s 
most profitable brands are Jeep and Ram (“About Us”).
FCA is the seventh-largest automobile 
manufacturer in the world in terms of revenue, and 
the eight-largest automobile manufacturer in terms 
of production units. It has roughly 15 major global 
competitors: Ford, GM, BMW, VW, Mercedes, Volvo, 
Toyota, Nissan, Hyundai-Kai, Subaru, Honda, Mazda, 
Tesla, Jaguar-Land Rover, and Mitsubishi. It is not a 
major global supplier of automobile parts. 
FCA’s current liquidity ratio - measuring its ability to 
satisfy its short-term debts using short-term assets - is 
0.77 and slightly decreased over the three-year period 
ending 31 December 2017 (see Table 1). In this time, 
CEO Marchionne aggressively paid down massive 
amounts of long-term debt that was on the balance 
sheet using cash on hand (Vellequette, 2018). FCA’s 
cash over that same period decreased by $10B to satisfy 
those long-term debts, while their short-term debts only 
increased by $4B. Analysts predict that though FCA 
does not have as much cash on hand as its competitors 
such as Ford or Toyota, FCA will outperform Ford in 
2018 partly because of the better financial position it has 
achieved under CEO Marchionne (Lawrence, 2018).
FCA’s net profit margin (the amount of after-
tax profit per each dollar of revenue written as a 
percentage) is 3.15%, and was on the rise over the three 
years presented in the table. Analysts have been pleased 
by FCA’s performance and it is notable that its profit 
margins have been more stable than its competitors’ over 
this period (Lawrence, 2018). FCA’s net profit margin is 
predicted to increase rapidly again in 2018, even though 
CEO Marchionne has announced his retirement at the 
end of this year. He will be leaving the corporation in a 
strong financial position.
The return on equity ratio (ROE) is one of 
the ratios that investors care about the most. It is a 
profitability ratio showing how much profit a company 
generates with its shareholder’s money.3 FCA’s ROE for 
the period ending in December 2017 was 17.40%. Since 
its founding, FCA’s ROEs have been rapidly increasing 
year after year, a pattern attributable to Marchionne’s 
strong leadership and the success of the company’s Jeep 
and Ram brands.
Industry Analysis: FCA’s Opportunities and Threats
The External Factor Analysis Summary (EFAS) Table 
organizes the relevant opportunities and threats that 
FCA faces as the Trump Administration reconsiders 
NAFTA and the rule-of-origin clause. The Table allows 
us assess specific factors in terms of weight. An average 
company would receive a score of 3.0. FCA’s score (see 
below) is 3.81, which demonstrates that it is responding 
well to the factors and performing slightly above the 
average company in the automobile industry. Five major 
opportunities and six major threats are identified and 
analyzed below.
The first opportunity (O1) for FCA is the 
existing domestic and global demand for high-margin 
SUVs (Bartosiak, 2018). The demand for traditional 
passenger cars is diminishing and FCA’s present vehicle 
lineup matches this scenario perfectly (Lawrence, 2018). 
FCA’s second opportunity (O2) is the rise of global 
demand for its Jeep and Ram brands. Jeep is one of 
3 The ROE is calculated by dividing the net income figure by the 
average stockholder equity. 
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Table 2: External Factor Analysis Summary – FCA and NAFTA
Table 1:  Financial Ratios calculated from Yahoo Finance, 2018
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the world’s most recognized brands because it has been 
used since World War II by the United States Armed 
Forces in missions all over the world. Additionally, Ram 
trucks have a favorable reputation compared to their 
competitors. The third opportunity (O3) available for 
FCA to exploit is its extensive and established cross-
border manufacturing and distribution network. FCA 
has a highly integrated and interdependent supply chain 
network throughout the NAFTA region, as well as South 
America, Europe, and Asia, built on longstanding trade 
agreements between nations, suppliers, and buyers. 
The existing NAFTA is FCA’s fourth opportunity 
(O4), simply because the entire auto industry has 
evolved to thrive under this system. FCA, and 
automakers in general, are betting that time and reality 
are on their side and that the existing NAFTA will 
survive the Trump Administration’s threats to alter or 
dismantle it (Howes, 2018). It is a reasonable position to 
take since a disruption of the status quo would severely 
hurt Trump’s political voter base most of all. The last 
opportunity (O5) identified for FCA is its partnership 
with Waymo, the former Google car company. Due to 
its smaller size, FCA does not have the budget to allow 
for unlimited or significant investment in necessary R & 
D to develop internally electric, hybrid, or self-driving 
technology. Through its partnership with Waymo, FCA 
aims to convert its Chrysler Pacifica into a self-driving 
vehicle in the near future (Bomey and Lawrence, 2018).
The first, and most heavily weighted, threat 
(T1) to FCA is the proposed changes to NAFTA’s rule-
of-origin clause. If adopted, the entire NAFTA region’s 
manufacturing network and supply chain would be 
completely disrupted. It would restrict automobile, 
parts, and components trade, and would result in 
material price increases for consumers (Meredith and 
LeBeau, 2018). This would significantly impact FCA, as 
it would be forced to hastily adapt to the modifications, 
which in turn would have a ripple effect on prices and 
bottom lines (Meredith and LeBeau, 2018). 
The second threat (T2) to FCA is rising interest 
rates and falling used car prices. Historically, the threat 
of rising interest rates has hurt new car sales and caused 
used car prices to drop (Bartosiak, 2018). This results 
in consumers choosing to buy used vehicles rather than 
invest in a new ones. It causes some consumers to forgo 
vehicle purchases completely, which would negatively 
affect FCA’s revenue. 
The Trump Administration’s new tax laws are 
a third threat (T3) to FCA. In January 2018, CEO 
Marchionne announced that the new tax laws were the 
direct catalyst for his decision to move some production 
of Ram Heavy Duty trucks from Mexico back to the 
United States (Lawrence, 2018). Even with the tax code 
changes, it will still be more expensive to manufacture 
those trucks in the United States as opposed to Mexico. 
It is a costly (more than $1B) and time-consuming 
(projected completion in 2020) endeavor to reconfigure 
FCA’s existing manufacturing and supply chain 
infrastructure. 
The fourth threat (T4) to FCA would arise 
should Trump act on his dangerously irresponsible threat 
to completely withdraw from NAFTA. This will result 
in massive job losses not only at FCA and throughout 
the industry, higher costs to producers lower returns for 
investors, and fewer choices for consumers. It would 
create a less competitive American auto and supplier 
industry as tariffs would then be applied at all levels of 
production and trade (Howes, 2018). 
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Another threat (T5) to FCA is the industry’s 
transition to electric and/or self-driving cars. Being 
smaller than its competitors has caused FCA to neglect 
investment in electric or self-driving technologies. FCA 
is not currently equipped to compete with industry 
leaders such as Toyota (i.e. Prius) or Tesla (i.e. Model 
3) on this platform (Bomey and Lawrence, 2018). The 
last threat (T6) FCA is currently facing is the Federal 
Government’s lawsuit against it over diesel emissions-
defeat devices similar to those in Volkswagens (VW) 
(Lawrence, 2018). CEO Marchionne has publicly 
pushed back even though the U.S. Justice Department 
is willing to settle. As of mid-March 2018, a California 
court had decided to allow consumers to carry on 
with their suit against Bosch, the manufacturer of the 
components that facilitated the emissions violations in 
the diesel Rams and Jeep Grand Cherokees. This does 
not bode well for FCA as it will likely end up needing to 
explain its side publicly in court.
Organizational Analysis: FCA’s Strengths and 
Weaknesses
Our examination of the internal factors of the 
automobile industry focuses on FCA’s specific strengths 
and weaknesses, especially as they concern the rule-of-
origin clause. Our results are presented in an Internal 
Factor Analysis Summary (IFAS) Table (Table 3), which 
allows us to assign weight to specific factors shaping a 
company’s prospects. An average company would receive 
a score of 3.0. FCA’s score of 3.39 demonstrates that it 
is performing slightly above the average company in the 
automobile industry. Eight major strengths and seven 
major weaknesses are identified and analyzed below.
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Table 3: Internal Factor Analysis Summary – FCA’s Strengths and Weaknesses
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The first strength (S1) that FCA has is its new 
commitment to invest $1B in its Warren (Michigan) and 
Toledo (Ohio) plants. FCA plans to move production 
of Ram Heavy Duty trucks from Mexico to Warren by 
2020, and to build a new Jeep production facility in 
Toledo (Lawrence, 2018). These moves will add 2,500 
jobs to the metro Detroit area and help FCA avoid a 
25% tariff if NAFTA falls apart (Shepardson, 2018).
FCA’s commitment to U.S. manufacturing and 
employees is FCA’s second strength (S2). In January 
2018, the company announced that employees, 
excluding executives, would be receiving bonuses and 
profit-sharing incentives due to new tax legislation 
(Lawrence, 2018). This has enhanced FCA’s brand image 
internally and externally, and it makes for good news 
headlines. Undoubtedly, FCA’s CEO Sergio Marchionne 
is a major strength (S3). He successfully ran Fiat since 
the early 2000s, leading it out of the 2008 financial 
meltdown, and was able to acquire Chrysler for pennies 
on the dollar. He has a reputation for knowing how 
to make money and is beloved by FCA’s employees 
(Vellequette, 2018).
Globalization of Jeep and Ram brands is the 
fourth strength (S4) that FCA has going in its favor. 
Under Marchionne’s leadership, FCA was able to 
take the Jeep and Ram brands to the global market 
(Vellequette, 2018). FCA brands are now sold in South 
America, Europe, and Asia, and are even projected 
to outperform Ford in 2018. Another strength 
(S5) identified is FCA’s ability to successfully strip 
undervalued assets to return money to its shareholders. 
Again, under Marchionne, FCA was able to sell off 
CNH Industrial ($20.25B) and Ferrari ($22.34B). In 
the near future, FCA is are planning to do the same with 
its parts maker Magneti Marelli (Vellequette, 2018).
The elimination of compact and mid-sized car 
segments from FCA’s line up is another huge strength 
(S6) because it allows FCA to focus on high margin 
SUVs and trucks. It was Marchionne’s decision to 
eliminate the Chrysler 200 and Dodge Dart, which in 
turn freed up working capital to invest in manufacturing 
capacity to expand the highly profitable Jeep and 
Ram lines (Vellequette, 2018). FCA’s strong segment 
performance is an additional strength (S7). Its North 
America, Latin America, and Europe segments all had 
outstanding 2017 performances, which contributed to 
FCA’s $4.4B earnings before tax (beating out their 2016 
$1.9B figure). As a result, Marchionne predicted that 
FCA would be debt free by the end of Q2 2018. At the 
end of 2015, its debt was more than $10.75B, but at the 
end of 2017 it was down to $3B (Lawrence, 2018). The 
last strength (S8) recognized is FCA’s Maserati brand 
and its components divisions, where huge improvements 
were made (Vellequette, 2018). These improvements 
materially contributed to FCA’s strong 2017 financial 
results.
On the weakness side, the first and most 
important one (W1) is that CEO Sergio Marchionne’s 
replacement has not yet been announced.4 Marchionne 
will be retiring at the end of this year and FCA plans 
to announce his successor in June 2018 at its 5-year 
business plan meeting in Italy (Vellequette, 2018). 
Speculation states that the new CEO will come 
from within FCA, but losing the powerful figure 
of Marchionne will have an effect. Another major 
4 Editors’ note.   Michael Manley replaced the critically ill Sergio 
Marchionne as CFA’s CEO in July 2018. Manley had previously 
been the head of FCA’s Jeep Division (www.reuters.com, 20 July 
2018).
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weakness (W2) has been FCA’s painfully slow pace of 
product renewal. For the most part, the company is still 
running with an old lineup of vehicles, which it has yet 
to improve (i.e. Dodge Journey, Chrysler 300, Dodge 
Charger, Dodge Caravan, etc.). 
A weakness (W3) that may be eliminated in 
the near future (if Marchionne’s efforts and promises 
pan out) is FCA’s unattractive debt. The company still 
had $3B in debt on hand at the end of 2017; however, 
analysts believe this is not terribly concerning because 
of the company’s aggressive actions taken to pay it down 
(Bomey and Lawrence, 2018).
The repeated delay of new product launches 
is the fourth weakness (W4) identified for FCA. The 
company has missed several release dates for promised 
luxury SUVs, such as the Jeep Wagoneer and Grand 
Wagoneer. This damages their image, and may cause 
consumers and investors to look elsewhere (Bomey 
and Lawrence, 2018). The fifth weakness (W5) for 
FCA is their botched reintroduction of Fiat to the 
U.S. Under Marchionne, FCA required U.S. dealers 
to make extensive capital investments in new Italian-
style showrooms to segregate the Fiat lineup, instead 
of showing it in existing Chrysler showrooms. This 
made huge dents in profits from the Fiat line in the U.S 
(Vellequette, 2018).
Another Marchionne-related weakness (W6) 
for FCA was his refusal to sell off the unprofitable Alfa 
Romeo brand to VW. Due to a personal feud with VW 
CEO Martin Winterkorn, Marchionne rejected the 
opportunity to sell Alfa Romeo to VW opting instead to 
invest $6B into the brand. Unfortunately, Alfa Romeo 
continues to be plagued with technical issues and has yet 
to turn a profit (Vellequette, 2018). The last weakness 
(W7) identified for FCA is that it does not yet offer 
electric or self-driving cars. FCA potentially faces huge 
costs of developing, selling, and servicing these types of 
vehicles. Electric Jeeps are not projected to be included 
in FCA’s lineup until 2020 (Bomey and Lawrence, 
2018).
Formulating a Strategy
When we combine FCA’s most significant opportunities, 
threats, strengths, and weaknesses into a matrix called 
the Strategic Factor Analysis Summary (SFAS), we 
can develop strategies that FCA can use to deal with 
potential changes to NAFTA’s rule-of-origin clause. 
The SFAS Table organizes relevant external and internal 
factors to enable strategic decisions to be made based on 
the highest-weighted factors from the EFAS and IFAS 
tables. These will help us predict the future success of 
FCA. An average company would receive a score of 3.0. 
FCA’s score of 3.91 demonstrates that it should perform 
better than the average company in the automobile 
industry in the near future. Using the SFAS Table, we 
have generated three strategies for FCA to use to prepare 
for any outcome related to NAFTA’s rule of origin 
clause.
The first strategy (Strategy 1) for FCA is to 
use S1 to exploit O2; that is, to use the new $1B 
investments in the Warren and Toledo plants to exploit 
the global demand for Jeep and Ram brands. This 
can provide insulation from any potential changes to 
the rule-of-origin clause and provide protection from 
the 25% tariffs that would go into effect if NAFTA is 
dissolved (Dawson and Stoll, 2018). Another bonus 
is the eventual tax benefits that FCA will receive by 
investing in domestic manufacturing facilities. The 
cons to this strategy are that a sudden drop in demand 
for Jeep or Ram brands could negate the investment 
in the two plants, as they are slated to produce Ram 
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Heavy Duty trucks and Jeeps in the U.S. where 
production costs are higher. If the existing NAFTA 
survives, this strategy will still be more expensive than 
manufacturing in Mexico (Meredith and LeBeau, 2018). 
Massive expenditures related to plant investment could 
contribute to an even slower pace of product renewal or 
the continued delay of product launches because cash 
Table 4: A Strategic Factor Analysis for FCA
flows would be diverted away from these activities.
The second strategy (Strategy 2) for FCA is 
to use S3 to exploit O4. FCA could encourage Sergio 
Marchionne to use his power as a public figure to speak 
out against changes to the current NAFTA even after 
he retires. The pros to this are that he is a well-known 
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and well-respected executive in the industry. He has a 
charismatic personality that grabs the public’s attention 
and he is beloved by the employees of FCA. He can use 
this status to advocate and lobby on behalf of FCA’s 
best interests. The cons to this strategy are that he is 
retiring from FCA, so he may lose some of his ability to 
influence policy and public opinion. His message against 
making changes to NAFTA could be misinterpreted by 
some as being against American workers. Additionally, 
the new CEO may not have the same vision or opinions 
as Marchionne.
The third strategy (Strategy 3) is for FCA to 
use S4 to exploit O3. FCA must use the successful 
globalization of its Jeep and Ram brands to exploit its 
cross-border manufacturing and supply-chain network. 
The pro to this strategy is that FCA gains access to 
new and evolving customer bases around the globe. 
This means that it may be somewhat insulated against 
changes to NAFTA because international customers 
will not be affected by modifications to the rule-of-
origin clause. FCA already has existing manufacturing 
facilities in South America, Europe, and Asia that can 
respond to new global demands. The con to this strategy 
is that if the Jeep and Ram brands suffer a sudden drop 
in demand abroad, then FCA may be more deeply 
impacted within the NAFTA region if the rule-of-origin 
clause is altered. Political instability in other regions 
where those brands are manufactured or sold is always 
a threat to FCA’s bottom line. They must constantly 
monitor and evaluate global and regional demand and 
political situations so that they can react appropriately 
to fluctuations in demand. They must be able to react to 
changes and modify their supply chains as required or 
make use of existing channels. All three of the strategies 
outlined above would help FCA to hedge against the 
effects from any potential outcome of the ongoing 
NAFTA renegotiations.
Conclusion
Canada, Mexico, and the American automotive industry 
are not in favor of President Trump’s plans to renegotiate 
NAFTA and modify the rule-of-origin clause, because 
of the resulting disruption to the established supply-
chain networks and the subsequent price increases 
expected for consumers (Howes, 2018).  Fortunately 
for Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, we do not expect there 
will be any significant changes to NAFTA this year 
(O’Grady, 2017). Additionally, it is even more likely that 
negotiations will stall this year because of the polarized 
American political climate and the 2018 midterm 
elections. We expect that furthering the narrative 
against the existing NAFTA will hurt the United States’ 
economy and trade reputation abroad. There are already 
consequences to this rhetoric in that our closest trading 
partners, Canada and Mexico, are actively seeking new 
trade markets with countries like Brazil and China to 
insulate themselves against potential transformations to 
NAFTA. 
We anticipate that FCA will be in a strong 
position to weather any potential changes to NAFTA 
and/or its rule-of-origin clause. We trust that that 
they will continue to benefit from the existing state of 
NAFTA in the meantime. Even with the impending 
retirement of CEO Marchionne, it is evident that 
FCA has many strengths that it can utilize to target 
successfully the opportunities available in the face of 
NAFTA’s uncertain future.
Our predictions must be qualified by some 
limitations, however. The situation is hard to read 
because of the Trump Administration’s inconsistent 
message. The Trump Administration rarely gives a 
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clear explanation of its intentions and often changes its 
stance. This April, the Trump Administration changed 
its position on NAFTA’s rule-of-origin clause, lowering 
its regional demand for car content to 75% from the 
original 85%, and has dropped its requirement that 
50% of a car be made from U.S. content (Mauldin 
and Hughes, 2018). Its hopes are that this will get it 
closer to a deal with Mexico and Canada for a revised 
NAFTA. This uncertainty is compounded by the fact 
that renegotiations of NAFTA are not shaped only by 
America. Canada and Mexico also hold substantial 
power in the negotiations and there is political 
uncertainty surrounding NAFTA in both countries.
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In today’s political climate where nationalism, protectionism and populism dominate the political discourse, democratic values are being interpreted in new ways. These interpretations 
give rise to fundamental democratic questions, such 
as: should certain aliens be allowed to have political 
rights when they have been living in, and contributing 
to, democratic countries for extended periods of time? 
This paper will contrast the political position and 
rights of Canadian citizens living abroad (expats) with 
those of permanent residents (aliens) living in Canada, 
demonstrating that the former have full democratic 
rights despite being geographically disassociated from 
domestic communities, while the latter are accorded 
no democratic rights despite contributing directly to 
the communities in which they reside. This raises the 
question of whether it is morally permissible to withhold 
democratic rights from certain aliens who contribute 
to their host society more than full citizens of that 
society who live abroad. Section one demonstrates how 
democracy is a tool for the institutionalization of liberal 
values. Section two shows how these values affect expats 
and aliens unequally and in a manner that is contrary 
to the values themselves, thus creating a statewide 
injustice. Lastly, section three presents an argument for 
eliminating the exclusion faced by aliens in order to 
resolve the contradiction in liberal democratic values.
 There are three distinct types of aliens in Canada: 
visitors, convention refugees, and permanent residents. 
For the most part, this essay is not concerned with 
the first two. This is because visitors are, as the name 
suggests, only in the country for a short period of time. 
They will not be there long enough to establish the 
vested interest that is required to share in the collective 
burdens and benefits of Canadian democratic society. 
Convention refugees, defined by the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, fall 
into another category, with which this paper is not 
concerned.1 Aliens, in the context of this paper, are 
permanent residents. Applications for Permanent 
Resident status must be made from outside of Canada 
and applicants are selected according to the government’s 
immigration criteria. Permanent Residents can be skilled 
workers, entrepreneurs, investors, self-employed persons, 
or family members of any of the aforementioned people. 
Section I
Liberalism values individual liberty – the liberty to form 
one’s own conception of the ‘good life’ – equality, and 
autonomy. Democracies set out to promote and protect 
individual liberty, equality, and autonomy. Therefore, 
democracy is a tool used to institutionalize liberal values. 
Because of this, democratic values parallel liberal values 
– with minor variations.  Democracies promote and 
protect liberty by ensuring freedom of speech, freedom 
of the press – even when it is criticial – and freedom 
of assembly. Another way that democracies protect 
individual liberty is in the form of negative rights. 
Aliens vs. Citizens: Who 
are the Real Enemies of the 
State?
SHELDON ALDERTON
1 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Convention 
and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” accessed August 
31, 2018, http://www.unhcr.org/protection/basic/3b66c2aa10/
convention-protocol-relating-status-refugees.html.
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Negative rights regard one’s ‘freedom from’ versus one’s 
‘freedom to’ – meaning that governments cannot and 
should not interfere with a person’s ability to access and 
take advantage of those rights. Negative rights are the 
rights to life, water, fresh air, and so forth. In the case 
of Canadian democracy, all persons – citizens and aliens 
– living within Canada’s borders enjoy these negative 
rights.
Another value of liberalism institutionalized 
by democracy is equality. There are many examples of 
unequal democratic situations, but these are beyond the 
scope of this paper. For now, it is fair to recognize that 
democratic countries promote policies that, more often 
than not, have the intent of equality and inclusion rather 
than exclusion. Autonomy is another democratically 
institutionalized liberal value. Liberalism views the 
self as an autonomous individual capable of self-
governance. In democracies, the tools are there for the 
self to pursue political participation but that self must 
begin this process on their own. The liberal self and the 
democratic self are both viewed as unencumbered and it 
is individuals who make up the whole. Liberalism and 
democracy share abstract foundational values; however, 
democracy also requires substantive values to promote 
liberalism.  
     An important democratic value is political 
participation. In order for a democracy to work 
effectively, there needs to be political participation 
from that democracy’s citizens. Politics is the preference 
scheduling of society, or in the words of Habermas, 
“the democratic process accomplishes the task of 
programming the government in the interest of society.”2 
In order for government to know the interests or 
preferences of society, participation needs to be realized 
on a scale large enough to represent an adequate sample 
of that society. The sample of preferences or interests 
is then aggregated to the whole society to determine 
governing policies. Another democratic value is rule 
by the people. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
democracy as “a system of government by the whole 
population or all eligible members of a state.”3 This is 
a virtue because states that are governed by the people 
they represent are generally seen to be more legitimate 
and stable. This is because it is easier for the aggregate 
of society to accept governance by their peers rather 
than a foreign power. Also, this arrangement seems to 
encompass a certain amount of empowerment. When 
people vote, even if their candidates lose, they feel that 
they were heard and that their interests were considered. 
 Because democratic governments are chosen by 
the people of a society, and those governments are bound 
to make decisions that benefit the majority of the people, 
achieving a kind of common good, it can be argued 
that democracy is the best way to achieve the common 
good. This is interesting because it strays from the liberal 
ideology slightly. Liberalism is concerned with ‘the right’ 
(or justice). It deliberately stays away from matters of 
‘the good’ (or morality). By the good, we mean the 
conception of the good life – the moral life – that 
persons choose to live. Under the liberal lens, persons 
are free – consistent with the liberal values mentioned 
earlier – to pursue whatever conception of the good life 
they wish. The liberal democratic state will not interfere 
with one’s choice of the good life unless it interferes with 
2 Jürgen Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” 
Constellations 1, no. 1 (December 1994): 1–10.
3 “Democracy,” Oxford Dictionaries | English, accessed August 31, 
2018, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/democracy.
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another person’s. If someone’s conception of the good 
life is counting the blades of grass in their yard, the state 
has no right to stop them. But if someone else decides 
that the good life is throwing rocks at their neighbours’ 
children, then the state has every right to forcibly make 
them stop. Liberalism and democracy treat matters of 
the good in different ways – total freedom according to 
liberalism, restricted freedom according to democracy. 
It makes sense that if people in democratic societies are 
governed by their peers, democracy would be the best 
form of government to achieve the common good for 
those people – a form of governmental relativism.
     Above are the substantive political values of 
democracy that stem from the abstract foundational 
values of liberalism. Additionally, from these values 
come certain social privileges that persons residing in 
democratic societies enjoy – freedom of speech, religion, 
movement, and association. Aliens will be subject to 
these privileges, with the exception of one: freedom 
of movement. Freedom of movement is the freedom 
to travel, live, and work anywhere one wishes within 
the borders of a state and is a democratic privilege that 
stems from the liberal values of liberty and autonomy. 
Only some aliens are eligible for this privilege, however; 
it is usually restricted. In this, there seems to be a 
contradiction between abstract liberal values and the 
substantive political application of these values. And this 
goes against the assertion that “for liberals, some rights 
are always grounded in a ‘higher law’ or … reason.”4 
How, then, do the contradictions between political and 
social rights and liberal democratic values affect different 
groups of people within the liberal democratic state? Let 
us explore them as they regard Canadian expats living 
abroad and aliens living within the Canadian state.
Section II 
Canadian citizenship is acquired via the English 
Common Law concept of jus soli – right of the soil. 
This means that as long as a child is born within the 
geographic borders of Canada (unless the child is 
born to a diplomat of a foreign country) that child is 
automatically granted Canadian citizenship. This is one 
of the reasons why Canada is so attractive to migrants 
from other, less democratic, countries. Migrants know 
that if they choose to relocate to Canada, their children 
will be included in the Canadian social fabric by 
virtue of birthright. The concept of jus soli is followed 
in North, Central, and South American countries 
but it “does not exist in Europe, Asia, Oceania or 
most of Africa.”5 Recently, the Canadian Progressive 
Conservative (CPC) party, at its party convention 
in Halifax, Nova Scotia, moved to “fully eliminate 
birthright [jus soli] citizenship in Canada.”6 This motion 
came from the concern of birth-tourism. Birth-tourism 
is when pregnant women travel to Canada for the sole 
purpose of having their children on Canadian soil, thus 
securing Canadian citizenship for the child. Suburban 
Vancouver British Columbia, particularly Richmond, is 
4 Frank I. Michelman, “Conceptions of Democracy in American 
Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights Concepts of Democracy: 
The Case of Voting Rights,” Florida Law Review 41 (1989): 443–
90.
5 Tristin Hopper, “Why Does Canada Automatically Give 
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said to be the epicenter of the birth-tourism epidemic.7 
The reason to repeal jus soli in this case is to eliminate a 
“free rider” scenario, though it is “estimated that there 
fewer than 500 birth-tourists” exist.8 If there is a free 
rider concern with birth-tourists, then this same concern 
must be applied to Canadian expats – who make up a 
much larger number than the former.9
 In Canada, even ex-pat citizens who have chosen 
to be geographically disassociated from the country 
are able to enjoy the benefits of Canadian values and 
privileges – regardless of whether they have the intention 
of returning. Not only do expats enjoy many of the 
benefits of Canadian democracy, they also benefit from 
the privilege of carrying a Canadian passport. Initially, 
this may seem to be a non-issue, but the following 
example will show how this could disproportionately 
affect expats and aliens, further highlighting the problem 
of expat exploitation and free ridership.  
Consider a Canadian expat who has lived 
in country X for five years and has no intention of 
returning; the expat no longer has living relatives in 
Canada and has built a comfortable life in country X. 
Now imagine a Canadian alien (Permanent Resident) 
who is a business executive for a major corporation and 
has been living in Canada for seven years with their 
family and is in country X on business. For various 
reasons the alien has chosen not to go through the 
process of becoming a Canadian citizen and holds 
a passport for country Y. While both the Canadian 
citizen and the Canadian alien are in country X, a 
civil war breaks out. People are fleeing the country in 
massive numbers and airports are overflowing trying to 
determine who can leave and where they can go. The 
Canadian expat, by virtue of a Canadian passport, would 
be placed on the first flight to Ottawa. Meanwhile, the 
Canadian alien is denied entry into Canada because they 
are not a full Canadian citizen. The alien must either stay 
in country X, where there is increasing danger or try to 
get a flight to country Y – where their passport is valid. 
In this scenario, the Canadian expat, who voluntarily 
left the country and had no intention of returning, is 
now safe on the ground in what is essentially a foreign 
country to them. Meanwhile, the alien is still in danger 
as they try to find a way back to a country they thought 
was their home. It is easy to see how this seemingly small 
detail – the ability to hold a Canadian passport – can 
disproportionally affect residents of Canada.
 Not only do Canadian expats get to keep 
their passports, they do not pay any Canadian tax on 
income earned outside Canada. It would be naive not 
to mention that expats will surely pay into whatever 
taxation system their country of residence deploys. 
The reason for mentioning this point is twofold: first, 
aliens in Canada are required to pay into Canada’s 
taxation system; second, expats benefit from Canada 
while contributing little or nothing in return. Canadian 
expats essentially receive collective benefits of Canadian 
society (except, as we note below, the right to vote) 
while not sharing in the collective burdens. The lack of 
a monetary contribution to Canadian society is just the 
first side of this problematic coin. Canadian expats do 
not contribute to the localities that make up the whole 
7 Paula Simons, “CPC Rejection of Citizenship Law Is the True 





9 CBC News, “Estimated 2.8 Million Canadians Live Abroad,” 29 
October 2009, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/estimated-2-8-
million-canadians-live-abroad-1.790218.
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of Canada. These could be local economies, participation 
in political parties or community associations, or even 
simply participating in general community discourse. 
While this generalization cannot be extended to all 
Canadian expats, surely some do contribute as much as, 
or at least close to, citizens within the borders. The fact 
is, if they wanted to both completely disassociate and 
still benefit, the current system of citizenship allows for 
expats to exploit it. In other words, Canadian expats 
are able to become free riders of the state with minimal 
repercussions. 
Section III
Intuitively, there seems to be a contradiction between 
the liberal democratic values that Canada is founded 
upon and access to the benefits these values create. It 
has been shown that democracy values participation, 
it has also been shown that the Canadian democracy 
explicitly excludes members of its society from that 
participation. This raises the argument that political 
exclusion of aliens leads to a contradiction in the abstract 
foundational values of the Canadian state. This political 
exclusion must be corrected if Canada is truly to make 
strides toward becoming a fully democratic and just 
society. In other words, for Canada to achieve a society 
that can be called fully ‘just,’ political rights must be 
extended to aliens – especially as they are extended to 
non-contributing, disassociated expats. Political equality 
for aliens needs to be realized in Canadian democracy. 
Democratic exclusion effectively equals democratic 
injustice. In the current situation, Canada is effectively 
using aliens, simply to benefit from them economically. 
They pay into all Canadian tax programs creating a 
steady stream of revenue for governments. Some of these 
programs, like Employment Insurance and the Canada 
Pension Plan, will bar aliens from enjoying the benefits 
these programs produce. The Canadian state advances 
liberal values while at the same time turning its back on 
aliens. If we are actively trying to advance certain values, 
while working just as hard against those values, how can 
progress be made? Canada needs to be a world leader 
in the acceptance of aliens. Our global community is 
becoming ever more connected and diverse, and Canada 
is in a position to embrace this by allowing aliens to 
access to its political arena.
     Frédéric Mégret, an associate professor of 
law at McGill, has recently penned an article entitled 
“Why Expatriates Should Be Able to Vote.”10 In the 
article Mégret give three reasons in support of his titled 
conclusion. First, Mégret argues that expats “have a 
vested interest in their country of citizenship”11 and 
that if they are unable to vote Canada is “depriving 
them of their only opportunity to exercise political 
rights.”12 These two points can be looked at from the 
point of view of Canadian aliens. Aliens also have a 
vested interest in the expats’ country of citizenship, 
maybe more so than the expats themselves. Aliens are 
participating in the daily life of Canadian communities, 
and have chosen to reside in Canada – which expats have 
chosen to leave – and this conscious choice shows which 
party was thinking more about their vested political 
interests. Secondly, Mégret says that expats are “affected 
by the law and policies of Canada,”13 aliens, being fully 
10 Frédéric Mégret, “Why Expatriates Should Be Able to Vote,” The 
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contradictory value injustices. Joseph Carens, a political 
scientist at the University of Toronto, writes about 
the same issues under the lens of temporary workers: 
“democratic justice requires us to provide temporary 
workers with most of the rights enjoyed by citizens and 
residents.”16 Carens’ conclusion should be extended to 
all aliens who reside in Canada for extended periods of 
time.
immersed in Canadian society, are clearly affected by the 
laws and policies of Canada as well. Lastly, it is said that 
expats “do a considerable amount for Canada, directly 
or indirectly.”14 Again, this does not seem to be a feature 
exclusive of expats. Aliens may do more for Canada in 
the sense that they are contributing to the social fabric of 
Canadian society more so than expats. It can be argued 
that if Canada is to extend political rights to expats for 
the reasons highlighted by Mégret, they can also be 
extended to aliens for the same reasons. Habermas wrote 
that “members of … solitary communities become aware 
of their dependence on one another.”15 If this is true, 
then aliens could be more beneficial to Canadian society 
than expats by virtue of participating in that solitary 
community directly.
Conclusion
This discussion of expats vs. aliens began with a 
demonstration of how democracy is a tool for the 
institutionalization of liberal values. From there it 
was shown how these values affect expats and aliens 
disproportionately in a way that is contrary to the values 
themselves. It was then demonstrated how this creates 
statewide injustice. In conclusion, an argument was 
presented for eliminating the democratic exclusion faced 
by aliens in order to resolve the contradiction in liberal 
democratic values. If Canada is to be a fully just and 
democratic country it needs to embrace globalization 
and lead the way in eliminating policies that create 
14 Mégret.
15 Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy.” 
16 Joseph H. Carens, “Live‐in Domestics, Seasonal Workers, and 
Others Hard to Locate on the Map of Democracy,” Journal of 
Political Philosophy 16, no. 4 (March 25, 2008): 419–45.
96 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018 BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY
Father, former construction 
foreman, board member, 
and now aspiring academic, 
Sheldon Alderton is 
currently working on a 
Bachelor of Arts (Honours) 
degree, majoring in 
Philosophy and minoring 




Carens, Joseph H. “Live‐in Domestics, Seasonal 
Workers, and Others Hard to Locate on the Map 
of Democracy.” Journal of Political Philosophy 16, 
no. 4 (March 25, 2008): 419–45.
CBC News. “Estimated 2.8 Million Canadians Live 
Abroad.” 29 October 2009. https://www.cbc.ca/
news/canada/estimated-2-8-million-canadians-
live-abroad-1.790218.
 “Democracy,” Oxford Dictionaries | English. Accessed 
April 26, 2018. https://en.oxforddictionaries.
com/definition/democracy.
Habermas, Jürgen. “Three Normative Models of 
Democracy.” Constellations 1, no. 1 (December 
1994): 1–10.
Hopper, Tristin. “Why Does Canada Automatically 
Give Citizenship to People Born Here?” 




Mégret, Frédéric. “Why Expatriates Should Be Able to 




Michelman, Frank I. “Conceptions of Democracy in 
American Constitutional Argument: Voting 
Rights Concepts of Democracy: The Case of 
Voting Rights.” Florida Law Review 41 (1989): 
443–90.
97 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
“Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status 




Simons, Paul. “CPC Rejection of Citizenship Law 
Is the True Threat to Canadian Values” 





98 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018 BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY
99 • The Undergraduate Review • Special Issue • 2018BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY
